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Abstract
Every object in the world has a physical size which is intrinsic to how we interact
with it: we pick up small objects like coins with our fingers, we throw footballs and
swing tennis rackets, we orient our body to bigger objects like chairs and tables and
we navigate with respect to landmarks like fountains and buildings. Here I argue
that the size of objects in the world is a basic property of object representation
with both behavioral and neural consequences. Specifically, I suggest that objects
have a canonical visual size based on their real-world size (Chapter 2), and that
we automatically access real-world size information when we recognize an object
(Chapter 3). Further, I present evidence that there are neural consequences of real-
world size for the large-scale organization of object knowledge in ventral visual cortex
(Chapter 4). Specifically, there are regions with differential selectivity for big and
small objects, that span from along the dorsal and lateral surfaces of occipito-temporal
cortex in a mirrored organization. Finally, I suggest that the empirical findings can
be coherently explained by thinking about the experience of an observer situated
in a three-dimensional world. This work provides testable predictions about retinal
size biases in visual experience, and an approach in which to understand the neural
representation of any object in the world.
Thesis Supervisor: Aude Oliva
Title: Associate Professor of Cognitive Science
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Over a lifetime of visual experience, our visual system builds a storehouse of knowledge
about the visual world. Incoming visual information rapidly makes contact with
these existing object representations, enabling us to effortlessly recognize objects
that are presented for only 100s of milliseconds (e.g. Grill-Spector & Kanwisher,
2006; Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot, 1996; for review see Logothetis & Shineburg, 1996).
Two fundamental endeavors for visual cognition and cognitive neuroscience are to
characterize the nature of these existing object representations and to understand
how are they organized in the brain.
Much behavioral research has focused on understanding the nature of object rep-
resentations, characterizing objects as either 3D-part-relationships (e.g. Biederman,
1987), or as image-based templates (e.g. Tarr et al., 1998). More recently, cog-
nitive neuroscience approaches have been increasingly important for understanding
object representation, but present an interestingly divided view. A few object cat-
egories drive responses in a spatially-contiguous and functionally-specific module of
cortex along the ventral surface of cortex, indicating category-specific object repre-
sentations (Kanwisher, 2010; Downing et al., 2006). However, most object categories
drive responses in a large swath of this cortex to varying degrees, suggesting more
category-general coding dimensions (e.g. Ishai et al., 1999; Haxby et al., 2001). The
patterns of activity to different object categories are reliable even across subjects
(Shinkareva et al., 2008), which suggests that there is some underlying organization
Figure 1: Real-world objects have a range of physical sizes, from objects you hold in
two fingers to objects that you can walk around.
to object representation that we do not understand (Op de Beeck, 2008a, see also
Freeman et al., 2011), and to date, there is no consensus on the features of visual
object representations (Kourtzi & Conner, 2011; Cavanagh, 2011).
One reason why we have yet to understand the overarching organization of object
representation is that it is not clear how to parameterize all of object knowledge.
There seems to be no continuous parameter that applies across all objects-instead,
objects have more typically been characterized using binary features (is it animate or
inanimate? Is a face or not?). However, one often overlooked and intrinsic property
of objects, that applies to every object in the world, is its physical size (Figure 1).
The real-world size of objects dictates how we interact with them, and fundamentally
shapes the distributions of our visual experience. My thesis is that real-world size
is a basic and fundamental property of object representation, with consequences for
both the nature of object representations and their organization in occipito-temporal
cortex.
Here I briefly review research that focuses on the nature of object representations,
and summarize our current state of understanding about how object representations
are organized in the brain. Next I discuss why the real-world size of objects may
be an important dimension for object representation, and review what is currently
known about the role of real-world size in object representation. Finally I outline the
contributions of this thesis, which presents both behavioral and neural evidence that
real-world size is a basic property of object representation.
Models of Object Representation
There are two classic theories regarding the underlying nature of object represen-
tations. Structural accounts claim that early transformations of the visual system
parse the world into simple geometric forms (e.g. geons), and objects are subse-
quently represented as a part-relations among simple 3D shapes (e.g. A suitcase is a
thin rectangular solid with a curved cylinder on top; Biederman, 1987). View-based
accounts claim that visual experience of the world is stored as a series of images or
views, and objects are represented by prototypical image templates (e.g. Ashbridge &
Perret, 1998). Distinguishing between these two accounts with behavioral measures
has proven to be empirically challenging, as demonstrations of view-dependent pro-
cesses do not necessarily imply view-based representation, nor do demonstrations of
view-invariant processes necessarily imply structural representations (e.g. Bar, 2001).
More recent approaches have tried to gain insight into the nature of high-level
object representations by focusing on the learning process. For example, Schyns and
colleagues have argued that as we learn new kinds of objects, we have to learn which
features will distinguish them from other objects (termed "functional features"); thus
the underlying features of object representation will be those that are in service
of categorization (e.g. Goldstone, Lippa, & Shiffrin, 2001; Schyns, Goldstone, &
Thibaut, 1998; Schyns & Rodet, 1997). This resonates with recent computational
approaches, which accomplish object recognition by using a set of hierarchal image-
based fragments (e.g. Ullman, 2007). For example, in this model proposed by Ullman,
small image fragments of car parts combine to make larger car fragments, which
further combine to make a car. In this model, the features are learned for a particular
category (e.g. fragments that help recognize a car), as opposed to category-general
features (like geons).
In general, modern models of object recognition rely on a hierarchy of learned
features, ranging from object-generic perceptual features like color and orientation
to mid-level features that have some specificity to particular object classes (e.g.,
Ullman, Vidal-Naquet, & Sali, 2002) to very high-level conceptual features that are
entirely object category-specific (e.g., Ullman, 2007). These models largely include
a computational efficiency constraint, such that the learned features are efficiently
represent the visual input. Such models derive a range of features, some of which are
shared across multiple object categories while others are more category-specific (e.g.,
Epshtein & Ullman, 2005; Ommer & Buhmann, 2010; Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999;
Torralba, Murphy, & Freeman, 2004; Ullman, 2007). At the end of this thesis, I will
propose that the size of objects gives rise to systematic biases in visual experience
which may be extracted by efficient learning mechanisms in the visual hierarchy:
specifically, there may be mid-level precursor object representations that capture
features shared across objects of the same real-world size.
Organization of object representations in cortex
Object-responsive cortex is found along the ventral and lateral surfaces of the oc-
cipital and temporal lobes (Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004; Milner & Goodale, 1995;
Ungerleider et al., 1982). Patients with lesions to these ventral temporal areas cannot
recognize visually-presented objects though they can see that something is there (for
review see Mahon & Caramazza, 2009), indicating that this large swath of cortex is
the site of our stored visual object knowledge. What has the neural characterization
of object representation in the brain revealed about object representation, especially
with respect to the the different models described above?
Functional neuroimaging experiments have demonstrated that, within this cortex,
there are a few spatially clustered regions that show responses only for a specific
category. Specifically, this is true for faces, bodies, scenes, and letter strings (Cohen
et al., 2000; Downing et al., 2001; Kanwisher et al., 1997; McCarthy et al., 1997).
These kinds of representations are expected from the computational models that
propose category-specific features at the top of the feature hierarchy. However, not
all objects have a focal patch of category-selective cortex-e.g. there is no such region
for chairs or for shoes. Instead most object categories drive responses in a large
amount of ventral temporal cortex, but to varying degrees. Such distributed response
profiles are more consistent with the models that learn shared features across object
categories, or even with category-general features (e.g. Geons) that can be used to
construct any shape (e.g. see Tanaka, 1996). These distributed patterns of activation
for each object category are consistent and reliable within a person, across people,
and even across species (Carlson et al., 2003; Cox & Savoy, 2003; Haxby et al., 2001;
Norman et al., 2006; O'Toole et al., 2005; Shinkareva et al., 2008; Kriegeskorte et
al., 2008). Thus, our current state of understanding about the organization of object
representation across cortex is that there are islands of category selectivity amongst
a sea of heterogenous unorganized (but systematic) responses.
Interestingly, approaches to understanding these patterns of activity have largely
ignored how they are arranged spatially across the cortex. However, we know that
the spatial organization of information across cortex is far from random (Kass, 1997).
This is evidenced in primary sensory cortices most clearly, with body maps, mo-
tor maps, tonotopic maps, and retinotopic maps. In visual cortex these maps are
mirrored-where visual areas are aligned by eccentricity and smoothly flip along
polar angle between vertical and horizontal meridian (e.g. Wandell, Dumoulin, &
Brewer, 2007). Beyond the sensory areas, there is further evidence of potentially
meaningful proximity, with face-selective regions adjacent to body-selective regions
(e.g. Schwarzlose et al., 2008), and partial overlap between neural regions responsive
to tools, hands, and motion (e.g. Beauchamp et al., 2002). Assuming that cortex
has meaningful topographic representations, and given that people show similar dis-
tributed activation patterns for objects, this suggests there are organizing dimensions
of object representation that we have not discovered (Op de Beeck, 2008a).
The size of objects in the natural world
The nature and organization of object representation has been approached through a
number of different frameworks. However, a fundamental observation about objects
is that they are physical entities in a three-dimensional world. Our experience with
objects, both in our life time and over evolutionary time, arises as we move through
the world. The physical size of objects in the world thus has a dramatic impact on
our experience of them, both (i) in how we coordinate our motor actions with objects,
and (ii) how object information projects onto the retina. Both of these consequences
of object size may have an impact on how object knowledge is organized across the
cortex.
First, the real-world size of objects is a fundamental dimension for active visual
experience. When entering a movie theatre or attending a lecture, how do we choose
the best seat? When making this decision, we actively maneuver to place the visual
information of interest into a particular part of our visual field, adjusting our angle and
distance to an object like the screen or podium, based on its size in the world. More
generally, object information arrives in retinotopic coordinate frames, and if we want
to act on this object we have to transform the information for the relevant effector,
be it hand-, head-, or body-centered coordinates (e.g. see Cohen & Andersen, 2002).
The real-world size of the object reduces the complexity of this mapping problem:
not all object are equally relevant for all reference frames. Small objects like keys
or paperclips require finger-based action plans, while chairs require body-coordinate
frames, and the exact position of the fingers with respect to the chair is largely
irrelevant (Figure 1). Thus, demands of action systems on visual processes may place
top-down organizing constrains on object knowledge in the ventral pathway such that
it is computationally efficient to be grouped by real-world size.
Second, there are systematic biases in visual experience driven by the size of
objects in the world-in retinal size, eccentricity, height in visual field, head-angle,
shape, and spatial frequency. Due to the geometric structure of the world, objects
of different sizes are interacted with at different distances, and thus gives rise to
systematic distributions of retinal size (Figure 2). A peanut at arms length subtends 3
degrees visual angle, while a car at a typical distance subtends 30 degrees visual angle.
Given that our eyes view the world from a height off the horizon, big objects will also
tend to be higher up in our visual field than small objects. Further, small objects tend
to be shaped for the hand and are rounder whereas larger objects withstand gravity
and provide structural support and are boxier: these differences in shape statistics can
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Figure 2: Hypothetical distributions of visual experience based on typical interaction
distances. Objects of different physical sizes in the world have a distribution of
visual experience over viewing distances. Estimates of typical interaction distances for
objects indicate that objects of increasing physical sizes are experienced at increasing
retinal sizes (see also Hubbard, Kall, & Baird, 1989).
be measured by combinations of image measurements that capture power at different
spatial frequencies and scales and positions across the image (see Oliva & Torralba,
2001; see also Haldane, 1928). Head angle is another dimension that is affected by
object size, where we tend to look down to small objects in our hand, progressively
up to big objects at the horizon. In the appendix at end of the thesis, I explain these
visual biases in greater detail and suggest that they can explain a number of low-level
response properties that have been observed in high-level visual areas.
Taking these visual biases all together, a consequence of natural visual inputs
is that objects of different sizes will have systematically different low-level statistics
arriving in early visual cortex. If visual systems are tuned to efficiently encode visual
input by extracting covariances (Attneave, 1954; Carlson et al., 2011; Field, 1987),
then these low-level correlated statistics are viable candidates. This would lead to
mid-level visual representations that apply to all objects of a particular real-world
size. Due to the way eccentricity is laid out across cortex, these mid-level visual
representations, in essence pre-cursor high-level object representations, may naturally
be arrayed by real-world size in more anterior visual cortex.
Previous research on real-world size
Up to this point I have been referring to "visual object representations", which are
the representations along the visual processing stream that enable recognition. In the
broader study of memory systems, this is referred to as the perceptual representation
system, as distinct from the semantic system (e.g. Schacter & Tulving, 1994). The
former concerns visual form (e.g. what an object looks like, allows us to name an
object from a picture), and the latter concerns associated semantic facts (e.g. can
move on it's own, is edible, is big, is a cow). Interestingly, information about the
real-world size of objects straddles this divide, and research has been done in both
areas.
Semantic information about real-world size is exemplified by a fact-based knowl-
edge: just as you can know the capital of Colorado is Denver, so you can know that
a building is 152 ft tall, or that an elephant is bigger than a mouse. However, given
the task to say which of two named objects is bigger in the world, the time it takes
is related to the log of their real-world size ratios; this is a classic signature of per-
ceptual comparisons, e.g. indicating which of two lines is longer (Moyer, 1973; Pavio,
1975; Rubinsten & Henik, 2002; Srinivas, 1996). This has led some to argue that
real-world size knowledge may actually be stored in some analog or perceptual for-
mat that preserves real-world size, and suggests that real-world size may not have a
purely semantic (non-perceptual) representation. However, understanding "size" as a
semantic fact is outside the scope of this thesis. Rather, here I focus on if, and how,
real-world size influences the perceptual representation system.
Surprisingly, very few studies on the perceptual representation system, i.e visual
object representation, have focused on the dimension of real-world size. In Bieder-
man's discussion of scene schemas, objects presented at the wrong real-world size in
the scene are one of the 5 scene violations: objects were detected more slowly when
presented at an atypical sized were detected more slowly than objects at a typical
size in the scene context (Biederman, et al., 1982). Knowledge about the real-world
size of objects ("familiar size") can serve as a cue to depth, but the nature of this
familiar size knowledge has not been directly examined. In contrast, there have been
many studies examining the dimension of visual size in object representation (Bieder-
man & Cooper, 1992; Fiser & Biederman, 1995; Cave & Squire, 1992; Srinivas, 1996;
Furmanski & Engel, 2000; Jolicoeur, 1987; Millikan & Jolicoeur, 1992). Here, "visual
size" refers to the visual angle of the object projected to the retina. One potential
reason for this focus on visual size in perceptual representation is that visual size is
the input to the visual system, whereas physical size (and viewing distance) have to
be inferred from the retinal projection. Further, in theory an object of any physical
size can subtend any visual angle, by moving closer or farther away. However, as
previously discussed, typical viewing distances are constrained by geometry and in-
teraction. This over-simplification has made it easy to miss the impact of real-world
size on visual experience with consequences for object representations.
Contributions of this thesis
My thesis is that real-world size is a basic and fundamental property of object repre-
sentation, with implications for the object representations and their organization in
occipito-temporal cortex.
Chapter 2 examines how visual size information is represented in our existing ob-
ject representations. In a series of experiments which required observers to access
existing object knowledge, we observed that familiar objects have a consistent visual
size at which they are drawn, imagined, and preferentially viewed. This visual size
was not the same for all objects, but was instead proportional to the logarithm of
the known size of the object in the world. Akin to the previous literature on canon-
ical perspective (Palmer, Rosch, & Chase, 1981), we term this consistent visual size
information the canonical visual size.
Chapter 3 presents evidence that real-world size is an automatically-accessed prop-
erty of object representations. In this study, two real-world objects were presented
at different visual sizes observers had to indicate which was bigger (or smaller) on
the screen. Even though the known size of the objects was irrelevant for this task,
we observed a familiar size stroop effect. A second experiment demonstrated that
this effect was not cognitively penetrable, implying that real-world size knowledge is
a part of visual representations acquired with repeated experience.
Chapter 4 presents neuroimaging data, and examines the impact of real-world
size on the spatial distribution of neural representations for objects without selective
regions of cortex. In a series of studies, I demonstrate that the representation of
objects in ventral temporal cortex depends on their real-world size, and suggest there
is a large-scale mirrored organization across ventral and lateral occipito-temporal
cortex based on real-world size.
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes and interprets these empirical findings within a
situated-observer framework. The object representations studied here were learned
over a life time; visual experience was not manipulated in any of these studies. How-
ever, I suggest that these behavioral and neural data can be coherently interpreted
in framework which takes into account the visual experience of a situated observer
in the three-dimensional world and assumes that the visual system is tuned to sta-
tistical regularities of experience. I also describe areas of future research where this
situated-observer framework can provide insight into the underlying representations
of objects and can make testable predictions about the neural representation of any
object.
Chapter 2
Canonical visual size for real-world
objects1
Real-world objects can be viewed at a range of distances and thus can be experi-
enced at a range of visual angles within the visual field. Given the large amount
of visual size variation possible when observing objects, we examined how internal
object representations represent visual size information. In a series of experiments
which required observers to access existing object knowledge, we observed that real-
world objects have a consistent visual size at which they are drawn, imagined, and
preferentially viewed. Importantly, this visual size is proportional to the logarithm of
the assumed size of the object in the world, and is best characterized not as a fixed
visual angle, but by the ratio of the object and the frame of space around it. Akin to
the previous literature on canonical perspective, we term this consistent visual size
information the canonical visual size.
Introduction
In the real world, the particular view of an object (i.e., its projected retinal image)
depends on where the observer is standing with respect to that object. This fact is
implicitly understood by observers choosing where to sit in a movie theatre, where
to stand in an art gallery, or where to move to get a better view of an item of
interest. When observers walk around an object, changing the viewing angle of an
object without changing its distance, this image transformation is called a perspective
'This chapter was published as Konkle, T. & Oliva, A. (2011). Canonical visual size for real-world
objects. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 37(1):23-37.
change. Similarly, when observers approach or back away from an object to change
its retinal size within their visual field without changing the viewing angle, the image
transformation is called a visual size change. Given the many possible object views
that can be experienced by an observer, what information about perspective and size
is present in object representations?
Seminal research by Palmer, Rosch, and Chase (1981) examined how object view-
point information was accessed in a number of different tasks, and found evidence for
consistently preferred viewpoints. For example, during goodness judgments of pho-
tographs of objects over different viewpoints, three-quarter perspectives-in which
the front, side, and top surfaces were visually present-were usually ranked highest 2.
The best" view was also the perspective imagined when given the name of the object,
the view most photographed, and enabled fastest naming of objects. The consisten-
cies across observers and across tasks led Palmer, Rosch, and Chase (1981) to term
this view the "canonical perspective."
Two main explanations have been suggested for why objects have a preferred,
canonical perspective. One account is motivated by object properties, where the
canonical perspective maximizes surface information visible with the least degree of
self-occlusion. The other account argues that canonical perspective arises based on
the distribution of visual experience. Evidence for the latter involves studies that
control exposure with novel objects, and find speeded recognition arises at more-
often experienced viewpoints (e.g. Bulthoff & Edelman, 1992; Tarr, 1995; Tarr &
Pinker, 1989). However, canonical viewpoints can be found for novel objects that
have been experienced equally from all angles in the viewing sphere (Edelman &
Bulthoff, 1992), suggesting that a purely experiential account cannot fully predict
the occurrence of canonical viewpoints. These explanations for canonical viewpoints
reflect a trade-off between constraints of object-centered properties, where shape and
orientation determines the best viewing angle, and viewer-centered properties, where
accumulated episodes with that object influence the preferred viewing angle. Likely
2There were a few objects for which this was not true, such as a clock, for which a pure front
view was ranked highest, probably due to the frequency with which it is viewed in this perspective.
both of these factors contribute to canonical perspective (Blanz, Tarr, & Bulthoff,
1999).
Perspective is determined by the physical orientation of the object relative to the
direction of gaze of the observer. Similarly, visual size is determined by the physical
size of the object relative to the distance of the observer to the object. Given that
there is evidence for canonical perspective, is there similar evidence for canonical
visual size? Here, we employed memory, imagery, and perceptual preference tasks
and asked whether these different mental processes yield consistent visual sizes across
observers. In addition, we examined the contributions of two factors that might
influence an object's canonical visual size-real-world size and framing.
First, we might expect knowledge about the real-world size of the object to mat-
ter for an object's canonical size. Intuitively, smaller objects in the world subtend
smaller visual angles on average than larger objects in the world. For example, a
typically sized car would subtend about 30 degrees visual angle at a typical viewing
distance of -9 m. For a penny to subtend that same visual angle it would have to be
held only ~3 cm away from one eye; at a more typical arms-length viewing distance,
it subtends 3.5 degrees. Thus, natural experience with objects might predict a sys-
tematic relationship between real-world size and canonical visual size. Alternatively,
maximizing the available object information could determine canonical size, e.g. if
the object is centered in the high-acuity foveal or parafoveal region of the visual field.
Such an account might predict that all objects would have the same canonical vi-
sual size that is related to acuity falloff with eccentricity, possibly modulated by the
internal complexity of the surfaces features of the object.
Second, size judgments are strongly influenced by the relative size of an object
within a fixed frame of space. In typical real-world viewing situations, a chair looks
the same physical size as we approach it, despite the increasing visual size it projects
on the retina-a phenomenon known as size constancy. However, failures of size
constancy can be found when the frame of space around an object is manipulated.
For example, Rock and Ebenholtz (1959) had observers adjust the length of one line
to match the length of a standard line. The standard line was framed in a small
rectangle, while the adjustable line was framed in a larger rectangle. Observers were
strongly biased to preserve the ratio of the line within the frame, adjusting the line
to be much larger than the standard, even though the task was to match the physical
length of the two lines (see also Kunnapas, 1955).
This framing effect occurs not only for simple stimuli but also for objects in the
real world, and is known as the vista paradox (Walker, Rupick, & Powell, 1989; see
also Brigell, 1977; Senders, 1966). Approaching an object makes it physically closer,
but approaching that object through the view of a window creates an illusion that
the object is both shrinking in physical size and getting farther away. On the retina,
both the visual size of the frame and the visual size of the object increase as one
approaches; however, the ratio of the object in the frame decreases because the frame
grows much more quickly than the more distant object. This illusion demonstrates
that our perception of an object's physical size and distance away are subject to
relative framing ratios, and are not derived from visual angle alone.
In the current experiments, we examined whether or not existing object represen-
tations show evidence for a canonical visual size. Using a drawing task (Experiment
1), an imagery task (Experiment 2), and a perception task (Experiments 3, 4, and
5), we found that all these tasks gave rise to consistent visual sizes across observers
and mental processes. We also observed a systematic and reliable correlation between
canonical visual size of objects and the logarithm of their assumed size in the world.
Further, we demonstrate that this canonical visual size is best characterized not as
a fixed visual angle, but as a ratio reflecting the object size relative to the frame of
space within which it is viewed.
Size Ranking
Observers have prior knowledge about the size of objects in the world, often referred
to as "assumed size" (e.g. Ittleson, 1951; Baird, 1963; Epstein 1963). In the following
experiments, we aimed to assess whether the assumed size of objects influences the
visual size at which objects are accessed across different tasks. Thus, first we gathered
100 images of real-world objects and had observers sort these objects into 8 groups of
increasing real-world size. These data will give us size ranks that reflect the assumed
size of objects in the real world, and will be used in the rest of the experiments. The
object images spanned the range of real-world sizes from small objects (e.g. a paper
clip) to large objects (e.g. the Eiffel Tower; see Figure 1). Additionally, we examined
how the size ranks compared with the actual real-world size of such objects.
Methods
Six observers (age range 18-35) gave informed consent and received $5 for their par-
ticipation. One hundred color pictures of real-world objects were selected from a
commercial database (Hemera Photo-Objects, Vol. I & II), and all objects appeared
on a white background (see Figure 1). The sorting procedure was adopted from Oliva
and Torralba, 2001. Thumbnails of 100 objects were arrayed on a 30 in (64.5 x 40.5
cm) screen, with a line separating the left and right half of the screen. Participants
were instructed to drag and drop the objects so that the large objects (large in their
real-world size) were on one half of the screen and the small objects (small in real-
world size) were on the other half of the screen. Next, the screen divided into fourths,
and participants refined the two sets of objects into four groups. This processes re-
peated one more time so that the objects were divided into 8 groups, ranked by their
size in the real world. Here, a rank of 1 represents the smallest object size and a
rank of 8 represents the largest object size. Participants were told that they did not
have to have an equal number of objects in each group and that instead they should
make sure each category of objects had roughly the same physical size in the world.
Participants could double click on a thumbnail to view a larger image of that object
(15cm x 15cm). Stimuli were presented using software written in MATLAB.
Observers were instructed to sort objects based on their real-world size", and we
did not explicitly instruct observers how to think of real-world size (e.g. volume, area,
extent). To obtain a measure of the "actual size" of each depicted object, we used the
following procedure. For each image a corresponding real-world object was measured
or approximated. In the case of the larger objects, the dimensions were found using
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Figure 1: Left: Database of 100 objects. Right: All objects were sorted into 8 groups
based on their assumed size in the world. These ranks are plotted as a function of the
actual real-world size of the object (cm), on a logarithmic scale. The graph shows is
a systematic logarithmic relationship between the actual physical size of the object
and the size ranks.
internet searches. The actual size of the object was quantified in cm (rather than
cm3 ), measured as the diagonal of its bounding box (i.e., the smallest rectangle that
completely enclosed the object), ignoring the depth of the object 3.
Results
The left panel of Figure 1 shows thumbnails of the object set. We defined the size rank
of each object as the mode of its rank distribution over the six observers. There were
9 to 23 objects for each size rank (mean 13 objects/size rank). Next we examined the
relationship between the size ranks and the actual size of such objects in the world.
The right panel shows the actual size of each object, plotted as a function of its size
rank, with the actual size plotted on a logarithmic axis. The graph shows that size
ranks and actual size are related by a logarthmic function. The correlation between
size rank and log1O(actual size) is r2 = .91, p < .001.
These results suggest that when sorting objects by assumed size, judgments about
which sizes are similar follow Weber-Fechner-like scaling (as do judgments about most
3 The actual size of the object could also be quantified as the diagonal of the three-dimensional
bounding box (height x width x depth). Because of the correlation between height, width, and depth
of these objects, the 3d diagonal and the frontal diagonal are negligibly different on a log scale.
other psychophysical variables, e.g. weight, sound intensity, frequency, etc; Stevens,
1957). For example, two objects at im and 10m in size are more different that two
objects at 1001m and 1010m. Similar ranking procedures and results were found by
Paivio (1975) and Moyer (1975).
These size ranks formed 8 groups of objects which were used in subsequent exper-
iments. While we could use the actual size measured from real-world objects, the size
ranks are used because (i) they reflect empirically gathered data about assumed size,
and (ii) provide natural bins of the assumed size dimension. However, it should be
noted that the size rank reflects a logarithmic scaling of real-world size, thus any sys-
tematic relationship found with size rank also shows a similar systematic relationship
with the logarithm of the real-world size of the object.
Experiment 1: Drawings from Memory
In Experiment 1, we used a drawing task to probe existing object representations,
which is a task that requires reconstruction from long-term memory. Similar tasks
have been used for studies of visual memory, but have typically been used as a measure
of visual free recall of a previously studied image (e.g. Carmichael, Hogan, & Walters,
1932; Intraub & Richardson, 1989). Here, we instead probed pre-existing long-term
memory representations. The observers' task was simply to draw a picture of the
named object on the page. Unbeknownst to the observers, we were interested in the
size at which they drew these objects.
One possibility is that all objects would be drawn at the same size on the page
(or at the same visual angle). This might be predicted by classic alignment models
of object recognition, which assume that all objects are stored at a specified visual
size in memory, and recognition proceeds by first mentally scaling the input or the
fixed template (e.g., Ullman, 1989). Another possibility is that there will simply be
no consistent relationship between the drawn size of objects and the assumed size of
those objects. Alternatively, there may be a systematic relationship between drawn
size and assumed size, where a number of quantitative relationships are possible.
Importantly, the task of drawing objects does not require explicit reasoning about
the assumed size of the object nor does it require making judgments about the drawn
size.
We also examined the role of the frame of space in which the object was drawn
by manipulating the paper size across observers. If the frame serves as a ceiling for
drawn object sizes, then we might predict that the physically small objects would
be drawn the same size across paper sizes, but the physically larger objects would
be drawn increasingly larger with bigger paper sizes. However, another possibility is
that objects might be drawn with a consistent ratio of the object to the frame across
paper sizes. This might be predicted if object representations are reactivated from
long-term memory representations relative to a space around them.
Methods
Sixty-four naive observers (age range 18-35) participated in Experiment 1. All gave
informed consent and received a candy bar and a beverage for their participation.
Twenty observers drew on the small paper size, 22 observers draw on the medium
paper size, and 22 observers drew on the large paper size. Participants sat at a table
and were given 18 sheets of paper (all of the same size) and a list of items to draw.
They were instructed to draw one object per page and were explicitly told that we were
not interested in artistic skills. We told participants to draw each object relatively
quickly (within 1 minute). When delivering the instructions, the word "size" was
never used.
The list of items contained 16 different objects that spanned the range of real-
world sizes, with two objects at each size rank. The objects were: paperclip, key,
pet goldfish, apple, hairdryer, running shoe, backpack, computer monitor, German
shepherd, chair, floor lamp, soda machine, car, dump truck, 1-story house, light house.
The order of objects was randomized for each observer. After all 16 objects had been
drawn, observers next drew two scenes, a beach and a park, in random order.
Across observers, we manipulated the size of the drawing paper. Observers were
not aware of this manipulation. The small paper size was 7.6 x 11.4 cm (3 x 4.5
inches), the medium size 18.5 x 27.9 cm (was 7.3 x 11 inches), and the large size
was 30.5 x 45.7 cm (12 x 18 inches), thus all three sizes had approximately the same
aspect ratio. All observers used a fine black sharpee marker to draw (i.e., the pen
width was fixed, and did not scale with the paper size).
To measure the drawn size of the objects, all drawings were scanned at a fixed
resolution (150 dots per inch). Custom software was written in MATLAB to auto-
matically find the bounding box around the object in the image, and these dimensions
were converted from pixels into centimeters using the known resolution. Drawn size
was calculated as the length of the diagonal of the bounding box around the object.
Using the diagonal, rather than as the height or width alone, better takes into account
variation in aspect ratio and has been shown to account for more explained variance
in relative size measures than height, width, principle axis, and area (Kosslyn, 1987).
The software proceeded one drawing at a time, and each object's identity and the
corresponding bounding box was verified by eye.
Results
The first author and one additional observer used a strict criterion to filter any draw-
ings with extraneous objects (e.g. trash bins behind the dump truck, a worm sticking
out of the apple, cords connecting the floor lamps, headlight beams on cars, air com-
ing out of the hairdryer), which constituted 21% of the images. The analysis reported
below was conducted on the filtered data set (887 drawings) 4 .
Figure 2 (left panel) shows the drawn size of the objects (in cm) plotted as a
function of the size rank of the object. The three lines represent the three different
paper sizes. A two-way ANOVA was conducted on drawn size with paper size as a
between-subject factor and object size rank as a within-subject factor. There was a
significant main effect of the size rank of the object on the drawn size of the object
(F(7, 391) = 30.1,p < 0.001, r = .35). That is, objects that are small in the world
4 The patterns in the data are unchanged when the analysis is conducted on drawn images using
a more moderate exclusion criteria (connected objects such as worms and wires included) or with
full inclusion (including the trash cans behind the dumptruck).
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Figure 2: Left: Drawn size of objects (measured in centimeters) as a function of their
size rank, for small, medium, and large paper sizes. Right: Drawn size of objects
(measured as the ratio of the drawn object and paper diagonal length), as a function
of size rank for small, medium, and large paper size. There was a separate group of
observers for each paper size. Error bars represent +1 S.E.M.
were drawn smaller on the page than objects that are large in the world. There was
also a significant effect of paper size on drawn size (F(2,41) = 70.9,p < 0.001,my =
.78), where the average drawn size of objects increased as the paper size increased.
Additionally, there was a significant interaction between the paper size and the effect
of the object size (F(14, 391) = 4.3, p < 0.001, = .13). In other words, there was
a smaller range of drawn object sizes on the small paper, with progressively greater
ranges of drawn sizes on the medium and large paper.
These data show a clear linear relationship between the drawn size and the size
rank (r2 = 0.88, p < 0.001, collapsing across paper size). Thus, this also demonstrates
that the drawn size of an object is proportional to the logarithm of its real-world size.
For each participant, a regression analysis was used to estimate a slope and intercept
for their drawn sizes as a function of the size rank. ANOVAs were conducted on
these slopes and intercepts, with paper-size as a between-subject factor. There was
a significant effect of paper size on slope (F(2, 61) = 28.7, p < 0.001, 2 = .48), and a
significant effect of paper size on intercept (F(2, 61) = 15.1, p < 0.001, rj2 = .33).
Across the 16 objects, the systematic variation in the drawn object sizes was
highly consistent. The effective reliability R, which is the aggregate reliability from
Size of Drawn Objects in Cm
a set of judges (see Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991) was R=.97.
Figure 2 (right panel) contains the same data as in the left panel, replotted to show
the ratio of the drawn size of the object to the paper size. This was calculated as the
diagonal length of the drawing divided by the diagonal length of the paper size. When
considering the drawn size ratio, there was no longer an effect of paper size (F(2, 41) =
1.01, n.s.), whereas size rank still significantly influenced the drawn size of the object
in the frame (F(7, 391) = 38.19,p < 0.001, 2 = .41). However, there was a small,
but significant, interaction between paper size and size rank (F(14, 391) = 1.82,p <
0.05, i7 = .06), which indicates that some of the items had a slightly different ratio
from small to medium to large paper sizes. For example, the smallest objects drawn
on the smallest paper size show slightly larger ratios than for the medium or large
paper. One possible explanation is that because all observers used the same sharpee
marker for drawing across paper size, they may have drawn the smallest objects
on the small paper size somewhat larger than on the larger paper sizes. Separate
ANOVAs conducted on the single subject regression fits revealed no difference between
the slopes across paper sizes (F(2, 61) = 2.1, n.s.), nor any difference between the
intercepts (F(2, 61) < 1, n.s.). Figure 3 shows example drawings, both to scale and
with normalized paper sizes.
Discussion
When observers are instructed to draw an object from an existing representation in
visual long-term memory, the drawn size of the object depends on at least two factors.
First, the drawn size of the object depends on the assumed size of the object in the
world. Small objects in the world are drawn small on the page; large objects in the
world are drawn larger on the page. Further, this relationship is systematic: the
drawn size of an object is proportional to the size rank (and thus to the logarithm
of its actual real-world size). Second, the drawn size of the object depends on the
scale of the space it can occupy. Small objects such as a keys occupied 27% of the
image (as measured by the diagonal of their bounding boxes relative to the diagonal
of the paper), whereas large objects like houses occupied 41%. Critically, the raw
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Figure 3: Example drawings of a car from three separate participants. Upper: small,
medium, and large drawings, to scale. Lower: the same drawings, normalized to the
size of the frame. The dashed bounding box is the same size in all three normalized
drawings for reference.
size at which objects were drawn (and thus the visual angle which the drawn images
subtended in an observer's visual field) were very different for the small, medium,
and large paper sizes, whereas the ratio of the object within the frame was constant
across paper sizes. This strongly suggests that when objects are reconstructed from
memory, the drawn size is best characterized not by raw visual angle measurements
but as a relative proportion between the object and a frame of space.
It is interesting that observers did not fill the page, even for the objects with
the largest size, which were only about 40% of the scale of the frame. That is,
observers preserved space around the edges of the objects, even on the smallest paper
sizes. However, it is not the case that observers always leave blank space around
all drawings-when observers drew a beach scene and a park scene, which do not
necessarily have a clear edges as do objects, the average drawn size was 81% of the
frame (SEM 1.8%)5. Further, this preserved ratio of the object and the frame is
especially striking when considering the drawings of the small objects on the large
paper sizes. In this condition, a paperclip was drawn on average 14.0 cm on the large
paper (SEM 1.6 cm), which is dramatically larger than its actual size in the world
(~3-5 cm). Thus, one intriguing possibility is that internal object representations
contain information about the relative visual size of objects and a spatial envelope
around them. For example, when drawing an object, the object is not scaled to the
paper; rather, the object and its envelope are scaled to the paper. A representation
of this kind would produce consistent ratios across different frame sizes.
An important open question is whether the observed relationship between the
drawn size and the assumed size of objects reflects a conceptual (non-visual) bias or a
perceptual (visual) bias. In other words, are these results driven by explicit knowledge
that, for example, cars are typically 5 m long? Whereas semantic (non-visual) knowl-
edge of an object's physical size likely plays a role, several points suggest that there
is also a strong visual component. First, the relationship between assumed size and
'In these scenes, the calculated diagonal ratio was not 100% because observers typically drew a
horizon line which extended across the entire horizontal axis, but did not necessarily make marks
for grass/sand that touched the extreme bottom edge and for clouds/sun/trees that touched the
extreme top edge of the paper.
drawn size is systematically logarithmic, which is a classic quantitative relationship
between perceptual properties and physical stimulus properties (e.g. Weber-Fechner's
law; see also Moyer, 1975). Second, this adjustment of drawing small objects smaller
and large objects larger was not the same across paper sizes; the range of drawn sizes
on the large paper was 11.2 cm, with only a 6.9 cm range for the medium paper and
only a 2.5 cm range for the small paper. However, when normalized by the frame, the
ratios of the object to the paper size were remarkably consistent. Although this does
not rule out a purely conceptual (non-visual) representation driving these results, it
is unclear why explicit knowledge of the physical size would be influenced by a frame,
whereas it is known that perceptual tasks (e.g., adjusting the physical size of a line in
a frame) are biased by framing ratios (Rock & Ebenholtz, 1959). Neither the current
study, nor the subsequent studies can adequately answer the question about whether
physical size information is represented visually or conceptually, but we believe that
both are probably involved (see Hart, Lesser, & Gordon, 1992). The important points
for the current study are that object information accessed from long-term memory
representations contains visual size information that is consistent across observers,
is related to real-world size, and is best characterized as a ratio with respect to the
space or frame it occupies.
Experiment 2: Imagery
Here, we used an imagery paradigm to probe size information in existing long-term
memory representations of objects. Specifically, we examined the visual size at which
objects were imagined within the frame of a computer monitor. Imagery processes can
be thought of as instantiating visual long-term memory representations (i.e., stored
knowledge about the visual properties of an object or class of objects) in perceptual
buffers (see Kosslyn, 1999). Thus mental imagery, like drawing, relies on accessing
existing object representations. If observers imagine objects at a size within the
frame of the computer screen that matches the size they drew objects relative to the
page size, this would show converging evidence using an alternate method of probing
existing visual object representations.
Previous work examining the imagined size of real-world objects is consistent with
these predictions (Hubbard & Baird, 1988; Hubbard, Kall, & Baird, 1989; Kosslyn,
1978). For example, Kosslyn (1978) used a mental distance estimation procedure
to calculate the visual angle at which animals of various sizes were spontaneously
imagined. Interestingly, he found that small animals were spontaneously imagined
at closer distances than larger animals, and that the visual angle subtended in the
mind's eye was positively correlated with the size of the animal. In other words, small
animals were imagined at smaller visual angles than large animals. He also noted that
observers were not preserving an absolute scaling of the animals' physical size in their
mental images, as the largest animals were imagined at less than twice the angle of
the smallest animals despite being an order of magnitude bigger in size. Kosslyn's
study was aimed at quantifying the extent of the mind's eye and not the relationship
between object size and spontaneously imagined size; however, these results provide
suggestive evidence that imagined size of objects might show convergent patterns
with the drawn size ratio of objects we observed in Experiment 1.
Methods
A separate group of nine naive observers were recruited from the MIT participant pool
(age range 18-35), gave informed consent, and received 5 dollars for their participation.
Stimuli were presented using MATLAB with the Psychophysics toolbox extensions
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).
At the start of each trial, the name of an object appeared at the center of the
computer screen. Observers pressed a key to continue, and the screen blanked for
2 seconds. Observers were instructed to form a clear mental image of the object on
the screen during that time. After two seconds, the mouse cursor appeared at the
center of the screen. As observers moved the mouse, a rectangular box centered on
the screen was drawn automatically: one corner of the rectangle was at the current
mouse position and the opposite corner of the rectangle was at the same distance
from the center of the screen in the opposite direction. Observers adjusted this
rectangle by moving the mouse, and then clicked when the rectangle "formed a tight
bounding box" around their mental image of that object. After the response, the
screen blanked for 2 seconds and the name of the next object appeared. The names
of the 100 objects in the object set were displayed in a random order. Observers were
given a demonstration of how to adjust the size of the bounding rectangle before the
experiment began.
Results
The left panel of Figure 4 shows the average size of imagined real world objects,
plotted as a function of object size rank. Here, the imagined size was calculated as
the visual angle subtended by the diagonal of the bounding box. The average imagined
size for two sample objects-an egg and a refrigerator, is illustrated in the right panel
of Figure 4. Averaging over the size rank of objects, observers imagined objects at
15.4 degrees visual angle (S.E.M.=4.5 degrees). Taking into account size rank, there
was systematic positive relationship with imagined size (slope = 2.8 degrees/size rank,
r2 = 0.98,p < 0.001).
Importantly, across the 100 objects, this systematic variation in the imagined
object size was again quite consistent across observers. The effective reliability was
R=.96. Thus, despite the subjectivity of the task to simply imagine the object, some
objects were consistently imagined smaller and others were consistently imagined
larger.
The imagery data can be converted into a ratio between the imagined size and the
size of the monitor. This allows for comparison between the drawing data (Experi-
ment 1) and the imagery data. Collapsing across size rank, there was no significant
difference in the average imagined ratio and average drawn ratio, (imagery: 34%, SEM
3.1%; drawing: 36%, SEM 1.2%; t(71) = 0.6,n.s.). However, the slope between size
rank and imagined size was steeper than in the in the drawing study (6.3% per size
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Figure 4: The average imagined size of objects on the computer screen is plotted as
a function of the size rank of the object (black line). Error bars represent +1 S.E.M.
The average imagined sizes of two objects (upper: egg, lower: refrigerator) are shown
on the right.
Discussion
The data show that the imagined size of real-world objects scales with the assumed
size of the object: physically small objects are imagined at smaller visual angles than
physically large objects. Further, when the imagined visual size was normalized by
the monitor visual size, the resulting ratios were fairly compatible with those found in
Experiment 1. Thus, the relative measure between the object and frame holds across
different observers, different tasks, and different kinds of frames.
In the imagery experiment, the slope of the relationship between size rank and
imagined size was actually steeper than the corresponding slope in Experiment 1.
One speculative account of this finding is that during the drawing task, perception
of the drawn objects constrains the dynamic range of the drawn size, and imagery
processes are not constrained in the same way. Indeed, Kosslyn (1978) found that
objects imagined from existing long-term memory were imagined at larger sizes than
when pictures of those animals were shown and then subsequently imagined. Further,
in his estimation of the "extent of the mind's eye", larger estimates (-50 degrees)
were obtained using imagined objects from existing long-term memory than when the
same method was used on images of objects (-20 degrees).
Hubbard and Baird (1988) extended Kosslyn's study by quantifying the rela-
tionship between the physical size of objects and the distance at which they are
spontaneously imagined ("first-sight" distance). They found evidence for a power-
law relationship between object size and first-sight distance (see also Hubbard, Kall,
& Baird, 1989). For comparative purposes, this relationship between first-sight dis-
tance and object size can be transformed to reveal the corresponding relationship
between the imagined visual angle and object size (as in Figure 4). Interestingly, this
relationship is roughly linear with log object size, consistent with our findings.
To assess whether a visible frame is required to drive the relationship between
imagined size and assumed size, we ran another imagery experiment in which there
was no visual frame. Ten observers were blindfolded and asked to imagine an object
(spoken aloud by the experimenter). After observers had formed a mental image,
they remained blindfolded and traced a tight bounding box around the object in
their mental image on a wall-sized blackboard in front of them. The 16 objects from
Experiment 1 were used, and observers were guided to a new part of the blackboard
for each object. Here, there was no visually present frame, but we again found a
consistent linear relationship with the imagined size and size rank (r 2 = 0.89, p <
0.001), with an average slope of 3 deg/rank, though there was much more variability
across individual's slopes (min: I deg/rank, max: 6.2 deg/rank). Thus, both imagery
tasks on a monitor (with a frame) and blindfolded (without a frame) showed reliable
and systematic influences of assumed size on the imagined size of real world objects.
Experiment 3: Perception
Experiment 1 and 2 used tasks that require observers to know what objects look like
in order to draw and imagine them. In other words, they require retrieval of existing
visual object representations. In Experiment 3, observers simply had to view images
of real-world objects on the monitor and determine the size at which the objects
"looked best." Similar tasks have been used on studies of viewpoint preferences (e.g.
Palmer, Rosch, & Chase, 1981) and the aesthetics of spatial composition (Palmer,
Gardner, & Wickens, 2008).
Because this is a perceptual task, one possibility is that the best visual size of
the objects is driven by visual acuity constraints. One might predict that all objects
will be sized at the fovea or parafovea (e.g. 2-8 degrees visual angle), perhaps modu-
lated by the complexity of the image, without any systematic variation due to prior
knowledge about the real-world size of the object. Alternatively, we might predict
converging evidence with the results from Experiment 1 and 2. In this case, the visual
size at which an object looks "best" might be systematically related to the logarithm
of the real-world size of the object.
Methods
A separate group of ten naive observers were recruited from the MIT participant pool
(age range 18-35), gave informed consent, and received 5 dollars for their participation.
100 color pictures of real-world objects were used (see Figure 1). Larger versions of
a few example images can be seen in the Appendix, and the image database can be
downloaded from the first author's website. The experimental setup was the same as
in Experiment 2.
At the start of each trial, the mouse position was set to the right side of the
screen at a random height. Then, observers were presented with one picture of an
object centered on a white background. The initial size of the object was determined
by the height on the screen where the observer clicked to start the trial. Observers
were told to select their preferred size to view the objects. Specifically, observers
were shown a sample object at the smallest possible size of -2 pixels ("intuitively,
this size is too small or too far away") and at the largest size such that the edges
of the object extended beyond the monitor edges ("intuitively, this is too large or
too close"). Observers were shown that they could freely move the mouse up and
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Figure 5: The average preferred size of objects, in degrees visual angle, is plotted as
a function of the size rank of the objects (left). Error bars represent +1 S. E. M. The
average preferred size of two objects from different size ranks are shown on the right.
view ("choose the view that's not too big or too small, but the one that looks best").
Each observer resized all 100 objects, with the order of objects randomized across
observers.
Results
Data from one observer was excluded because they did not complete the task for
all objects. The left panel of Figure 5 shows the average preferred visual size of
the objects, plotted as a function of the size rank of those objects. As in previous
experiments, the preferred visual size was calculated as the visual angle subtended by
the diagonal of the bounding box. The average preferred size for two sample objects-
an egg and a refrigerator, is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 5. The data show
that as the assumed size of the objects increases, the preferred visual size at which to
view them on the screen also increases systematically (r 2 = 0.96, p < 0.001). Thus,
we again find a consistent relationship between the preferred visual size of the object
and the size rank of that object in the world.
Across the 100 objects, the systematic variation in the preferred visual size was
)
again very consistent across observers. The effective reliability was R=.84. Thus,
despite the subjectivity of the task to select the "best view," smaller objects were
consistently sized smaller and larger objects were consistently sized larger across ob-
servers.
These data can be converted into a ratio between the preferred visual size and the
size of the monitor. Collapsing across the size ranks, the average preferred size ratio
was 36% (SEM 3.6%), which was not significantly different from the average imagined
size ratio or the average drawn size ratio (Experiment 1 - drawing: t(71) = 0.17, n.s.;
Experiment 2 - imagery: t(16) = 0.56, n.s.). The slope of the regression line between
size rank and preferred visual size was 3.9% per size rank (SEM 0.8%), which was
significantly shallower than the imagery slope in Experiment 2 (mean: 6.3% per size
rank, t(16) = 2.25,p < 0.05) with a trend toward being steeper than the drawn slope
in Experiment 1 (mean: 2.7% per size rank, t(71) = 1.99,p < 0.06).
Discussion
These data show that when observers can freely resize objects on the screen, the
preferred view of the object is proportional to the logarithm of their real-world sizes.
These data rule out the simple account that acuity constraints drive visual pref-
erences, because objects were not all resized to subtend equal visual angles at the
maximal extent of the fovea or parafovea. Instead, we find that knowledge about
the physical size of objects systematically influences the visual size at which objects
are preferentially viewed. Similarly, the preferred visual sizes within the frame of the
monitor match the ratios observed in the drawing experiment well. Thus, these data
suggest that perceptual preferences about objects are related to the representations
invoked by drawing and imagery tasks.
The current experiment required subjective judgments about the size at which
pictures of objects "look best" (see also Palmer, Gardner, & Wickens, 2008). Despite
the subjectivity of this task, observers were remarkably consistent in their preferred
visual sizes, with high inter-rater reliability. One interpretation of what drives the
preferred view of an object is the view with the best representational fit to existing
long-term memory representations (Palmer, Schloss, and Gardner, in press). Specif-
ically, the visual size at which a refrigerator looks best is the visual size (and the
space around it) that matches with existing object representations, i.e., those that
guided the drawing and imagery tasks. Perceptual preference tasks have also been
conceptualized as a consequence of memory processes reflecting the output of the hu-
man inference system (Weber & Johnson, 2006). Akin to the previous literature on
canonical perspective, we term this consistent visual size information the canonical
visual size. This visual size depends on the assumed size of the object and is best
specified not in terms of visual angle but in terms of visual size ratios between the
object and a frame of space.
Experiment 4: Miniatures
In Experiment 4, we manipulated the size observers assumed an object to be in the
world by presenting them with an image of a real-world object but telling them that
it was a miniature version of that object, fit for a highly detailed architectural model.
If the visual size ratio is truly a consequence of the physical size the observer believes
the object to be in the world, then a "miniature" object should be preferentially
viewed at a smaller size than its larger real-world counterpart.
An alternate account that predicts the data from Experiment 3 is that perhaps
observers prefer to see all objects at a certain average visual size, but tend to mod-
ulate their settings around this size based on knowledge about the physical size of
the object in the world. On this account, in this experiment observers who are view-
ing "miniature" objects should not show any difference in their preferred size ratios
compared to observers who believed the objects to be typically sized real-world ob-
jects. They should have the same mean size setting, and should modulate around
that preferred size by the same or perhaps a smaller dynamic range.
Further, the preferred visual sizes found in Experiment 3 could have been driven by
image-level information solely (e.g. resolution, downward viewing angle, aspect ratio).
The converging evidence from Experiment 1 and 2 make this unlikely. However, the
miniature experiment serves as a control, as it uses exactly the same images and task
as in Experiment 3, with only instructional variations. Thus, any differences in the
preferred visual size between objects and miniature objects cannot be attributed to
image-level effects.
Methods
A separate group of ten naive observers were recruited from the MIT participant pool
(age range 18-35), gave informed consent, and received 5 dollars for their participa-
tion. Stimuli and procedures were identical to those in Experiment 3, except for the
instructions given. Here, the participants were told that they were looking at pictures
of "toys" from a "highly detailed architectural model" (i.e., the kind of model that
might have a toy cheese grater and a toy basketball). As before, participants were
instructed to resize the objects on the screen so that they "looked the best".
Results
The left panel of Figure 6 shows the average preferred size of the objects that are
thought of as "toys" (black line). For comparative purposes, these are plotted as
a function of the same size rank used previously. The data from Experiment 3 is
replotted for comparison (gray line). The average preferred size for two sample toy
objects-a toy egg and a toy refrigerator, is illustrated in the right panel, along side
the preferred size of the "typically-sized" egg and refrigerator from Experiment 3.
Overall, the average preferred size of toy objects on the screen was 5.5 degrees
(S.E.M=2.13 deg), whereas the average preferred size of the same objects from Ex-
periment 3 was 13.1 degrees (S.E.M.=3.3 deg; t(18) = 4.65,p < 0.001). As before, the
preferred size of the objects, when seen "as toys" by the observers, still preserve the
strong correlation with the size rank of the objects (r2 = 0.99, p < 0.001). The slopes
of the regression lines between Experiment 3 sizing regular objects and Experiment 4
sizing toy objects were not significantly different (Object: 3.9% per rank, Toy: 3.1%
per rank, t(18) = 0.9, n.s.). Further, observers were very consistent in the relative
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Figure 6: Left: The average preferred size to see images of "toy" objects on the
screen is plotted as a function of the size rank of the object (black line). The data
from Experiment 3 is replotted for comparison (gray line), in which a different set
of observers resized the same images but thought of them as regular objects. Error
bars represent ±1 S. E. M. Right: The average preferred sizes of two toy objects
are shown next to the average preferred sizes of those objects when assumed to be a
typical real-world size.
sizes across all 100 objects, with an effective rater reliability of R=0.94.
Discussion
When observers think objects are smaller in the world, the preferred sizes of those
objects are smaller on the screen. This is true even though separate groups of ob-
servers participated in Experiments 3 and 4. Further, this experiment demonstrates
that preferred visual sizes are not driven solely by the image-level differences or the
relationship between objects in the set, because the images in Experiment 3 and 4
were the same. Additionally, the relationship between preferred size and assumed size
is preserved when observers think of the objects as miniatures. Likely this reflects
the instructions that these objects were for a model, i.e., made "to scale" but at a
smaller physical size. The largest miniature objects (e.g., houses, statue) were sized
on the screen at around 27%. Thus we can estimate that observers likely thought of
these images as having a physical size of around 30 - 60 cm (e.g. a coffeemaker or
backpack), based on the Experiment 3 size ratios.
The current data also have interesting implications about how assumed real-world
size influences preferred visual size, and what kind of information is stored in object
representations. Likely, we don't have much visual experience with toy cheese graters,
but we do have experience with cheese graters and with toys. It is also likely that
learning from experience operates at multiple levels of abstraction (e.g., this specific
cheese grater, all cheese graters, all kitchen appliances; and this toy, toys in general).
Thus, such learned attributes can flexibly combine to generate a representation of,
for example, a toy cheese grater, without ever having seen one before. As evidence
that this is learned over experience, 18 to 30 month-old children sometimes make
scale-errors, in which they attempt to get into a toy car or sit in a dollhouse chair,
indicating that they can recognize a toy version of the object, but fail to incorporate its
apparent physical size and instead carry out the associated actions with the typically-
sized objects (DeLoache, 2004).
Another implication of this result is that assumed size modulates expectations
about visual size. Put more strongly, a cheese grater on a white background will
look more like a miniature cheese grater if it has a small ratio on the screen. Even
though there were completely different observers between Experiment 3 and 4, the
preferred visual size of miniatures was smaller than the preferred visual size of real-
world objects. This further reinforces the main result that smaller objects in the
world have smaller canonical visual sizes.
Experiment 5: Size Range
An additional factor that may be influencing the preferred size is the range of real-
world object sizes in the image set. In all of the experiments reported here, par-
ticipants were exposed to the whole range of real-world sizes (ranks 1-8, from very
small to very large size). Here, we tested the impact of stimulus set in the perceptual
preference task using a between-subjects design, where three groups of observers are
exposed to a restricted range of objects sizes (e.g. only small objects in the world,
only objects of medium size, or only large objects). If observers simply use a minimum
small visual size for the smallest object and a maximum visual size for the largest
objects, and scale the other objects between these two extremes, then the visual sizes
we observe will be largely due to the stimulus set and not due to the absolute assumed
size of the object. However, if there are reliable differences in the preferred visual
sizes between the observer groups, even when the groups are exposed to a restricted
range of real-world object sizes, then this would show that observers are guided by a
common canonical visual size representation.
Methods
Three groups of 11 nafve observers were recruited from the MIT participant pool (age
range 18-35), gave informed consent, and received 5 dollars for their participation.
Observers completed the same procedure as in Experiment 3, but were exposed to
only a subset of the items, with one group seeing only small items (ranks 1-4), another
group seeing only medium items (ranks 3-6), and the final group seeing only large
items (ranks 5-8).
Results
First, we examined if there were reliable differences between the three groups of
observers on the averaged preferred size. We found a significant effect of group on
the preferred size ratio (F(2, 30) = 4.4,p < 0.05, r 2 = .22), consistent with our
predictions from Experiments 1-4: smaller visual sizes were preferred for the group
seeing smaller real-world objects and larger visual sizes were preferred for the group
seeing larger real-world objects.
We next compared the preferred visual sizes of each group with the original exper-
iment in which observers were exposed to all size ranks 1 though 8. Three ANOVAs
were conducted on the size ratios, one for each group of observers, with size rank as
a within-subject factor, and stimulus set range as a between-subject factor (e.g. data
from the observers seeing only the smallest objects was compared with data from
-e- Group I
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Figure 7: Results of size range experiment. The average preferred size of objects
for the three groups of observers, expressed as a ratio between the size of the object
and the size of the screen, is plotted for each group as a function of the size rank of
the objects. Dashed line indicates the preferred sizes from Experiment 3. Error bars
represent ±1 S.E.M.
Experiment 3 for only the object size ranks of 1, 2, 3, and 4, and similarly for those
seeing medium sized objects or large sized objects). The results are shown in Figure 7.
Overall, the average preferred size for small objects was the same whether observers
were only exposed to that range or the full physical size range (ranks 1-4; means:
32% and 29%; F(1, 18) = 0.7, n.s.). The same held for observers seeing only medium
size objects (ranks 3-6; means: 39% and 38%; F(1, 18) = 0.0, n.s.) and for those
seeing large objects only (ranks: 5-8; means: 45% and 45%; F(1, 18) = 0.0, n.s.).
However, observers who saw only medium-sized objects or only large objects used
a larger range of ratios on the screen than observers exposed to the whole range
of objects physical sizes (medium ranks 3-6: experiment x size rank interaction:
F(1, 18) = 8.2,p < 0.01, r/2 = .31; large ranks 5-8: experiment x size rank inter-
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Figure 8: Trial 1 Analysis. Average drawn, imagined, or preferred visual size for the
first trial only of all Experiments 1-5. These visual sizes are expressed as a ratio
between the size of the object and the size of the frame, plotted as a function of the
size rank of the objects. Each gray point represents a participant, with the average
visual size per size rank shown in black points.
Discussion
These results show that the range of physical sizes does have an effect on the preferred
visual sizes, by modulating the dynamic range between the smallest and largest item.
Specifically, the preferred sizes found in the three observer groups have more size
range than the preferred sizes found by participants exposed to the whole range in
Experiment 3. This reveals that the object set, or the context in which a collection of
objects is perceived, is another factor that modulates the preferred visual size. This
result is interesting because it suggests that people have some flexibility in the scaling
between assumed size and visual size. However, for the present purposes, it is also
important to note that overall, the average visual size increased for each group exposed
respectively only to small, medium or large objects and was consistent with the visual
sizes from a different set of observers who were exposed to the whole object set. This
demonstrates that the assumed size of objects influenced their preferred visual sizes,
even across observers and stimuli ranges: smaller visual sizes were preferred for smaller
objects and larger visual sizes were preferred for larger objects.
A related concern is that, over the course of multiple trials in the experiment,
exposure to different objects with different real-world sizes may lead observers to
adopt a systematic relationship between assumed size and preferred visual size over
time. Thus, perhaps without this exposure to a variety of stimuli with different real
world sizes, there would be no remaining effect of assumed size. If this were the case,
then one would not expect to find an effect of real-world size on the very first trial. To
examine this possibility, we conducted an analysis of the first trial completed for the
94 observers in Experiments 1 through 5 (excluding the first drawings of 21 observers
in El which did not meet the criterion for inclusion). We again observe a positive
relationship between the physical size rank the visual size (r 2 = 0.18, df = 93, p <
0.001; Figure 8). The slope of relationship is 3.2% per size rank. For reference,
the average slope was 2.7% for drawing, 3.9% for perception, and 6.3% for imagery.
Thus, despite the lack of power due to having only one trial per subject, this analysis
suggests that, even on the first trial, the small objects were drawn, imagined and
preferentially viewed at smaller size ratios than large objects. While there is likely
a contribution of intertrial comparisons on the size effects found here, these analyses
suggest that the consistency of the size ratios we have found in perceptual, imagery
and memory tasks are not solely a consequence of intertrial comparisons or object set
effects.
General Discussion
Evidence for canonical visual size
In the current studies, we asked whether accessing real world object knowledge yields
consistent visual size representations across different mental processes. Using drawing
from memory, imagery, and perceptual preference tasks we found that systematic
visual size ratios were observed across different mental processes and across observers
(See Figure 9). These results provide evidence for different canonical visual sizes for
differently sized physical objects. Second, the data demonstrate that the canonical
visual size of an object depends on the assumed real-world size of the object. Across
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Figure 9: Left: Results of Experiments 1 (Drawn), 2 (Imagined), and 3 (Viewed),
overlaid on one graph. The x-axis shows the size rank of the object; the y-axis shows
the diagonal ratio of the object in the frame. Error bars represent +1 S.E M. Right:
Example drawings of a fish, chair, and dump truck for a single observer. The average
imagined size and preferred size across observers are shown for these same objects
in the adjacent columns. Note that separate groups of observers participated in the
Drawn, Imagined, and Viewed conditions.
all experiments and observers, there was a strong correlation with the size rank, and
thus with the logarithm of the assumed size of the object in the world (Figure 9).
This claim is further supported by the miniatures experiment in which we manipulated
assumed size and showed corresponding changes in preferred visual size. Finally, these
data argue that the canonical visual size is best characterized as a ratio between the
object and the space around it. For instance, the canonical visual size of a chair is not
a specific visual angle but rather is 38% of a surrounding spatial envelope (Figure 9).
Experiment 1 most strongly supports specifying canonical visual size as a ratio, as the
drawn size for any given object was equivalent across paper sizes when characterized
as a ratio between the object and frame.
On a broader interpretation of these data, tasks which access object represen-
tations for visual size information are likely probing an underlying distribution of
visual sizes, rather than just one specific canonical visual size. For example, while
a strawberry may look best when presented at a size ratio of 18%, this may reflect
only the most probable of a range of possible visual sizes. Exemplar-based models
and view-centered models of object representation argue that observers store many
instances of objects (e.g. Nosofsky, 1986; Edelman & Butlhoff, 1992; Ullman, 1989);
if visual size information is also stored with these exemplars, this could give rise to
a probability distribution over this dimension. The idea that object knowledge oper-
ates over probability distributions along various spatial and featural dimensions has
received support from memory paradigms, in which systematic biases can be observed
that reflect coding an episode with respect to a prior distribution (e.g. Huttenlocher,
Hedges, & Duncan, 1991; Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Vevea, 2000; Konkle & Oliva,
2007; Hemmer & Steyvers, 2009; see also Baird, 1997). Broadly, accessing an existing
object representation, e.g., for a drawing or imagery task, can be thought of as taking
a sample from underlying distributions, of which visual size and perspective may be
stored dimensions.
Framing effects
We found that observers were sensitive to the amount of space specified by a frame,
drawing objects in such a way that across observers, a consistent ratio between the
object and the paper size was preserved over a range of different frame sizes. These
findings show converging evidence in support of a framing account of the "vista para-
dox," in which a large distant object viewed through a window (or through a naturally
occurring corridor, e.g. in a cavern or street scene) appears to both shrink in physical
size and recede in distance as the observer approaches it (Walker, Rupich, & Powell,
1989; see also the "coffee cup illusion", Senders, 1966). This notion that the framing
ratio affects the perception of an object's physical size properties, beyond information
from the object alone, has been documented in a number of other studies (e.g. Brigell
et al, 1977, Kunnapas, 1955, Rock & Ebenholt, 1959). Further, it is interesting to
note that under natural viewing conditions, objects are always seen in a space, max-
imally limited by the extent of the visual field. As such, any experienced view of an
object has an implicit frame of space around it.
The relationship of the object with the space around it is only one simple statistic
that may be stored from visual experience. More generally, these framing effects
support the notion that object representations are inherently linked to contexts, both
spatially and semantically (e.g. Bar, 2004; Oliva & Torralba, 2007). For example,
reaction time benefits are found for identifying objects in semantically consistent
versus inconsistent scenes (e.g., Palmer, 1975; Biederman, Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz,
1982; Davenport & Potter, 2004), as well as for items appearing in a more likely
position given the identity and position of a previous item (e.g. Grunau, Neta, & Bar,
2008). Combined, these results highlight the relative nature of object representations:
in our accumulated visual experience with objects in the world, objects never appear
in isolation. As such, pre-existing knowledge of object properties may be specified not
only as item-specific information but also with more relative statistics, such as object-
object and object-scene associations (e.g. keyboard and mouse; bed and bedroom).
In the case of object size, for instance, we suggest that rather than simply storing
visual angle information about objects, the relevant statistics may actually be relative
measures between object angle and a visual frame of space.
Task-Demand Characteristics
One concern about these results is the issue of task-demands: are people showing ef-
fects of assumed object size because they are explicitly thinking about size while they
make a size response? There are several pieces of data that speak to this issue. First,
while both the imagery and perception studies (E2 and E3) directly involve making
a resizing response, the drawing study (El) does not. Here, the task instructions
focus much more on object identity ("draw a cat"), while the drawn size is an indi-
rect aspect of the task. Importantly, the results still show an effect of assumed object
size. Second, demand characteristics might arise over the course of the experiment, as
observers reference previous responses rather than treating each trial independently.
Indeed, this is evident in our data in the restricted size range experiment (E5). How-
ever, even on observers' very first trial, the drawn/imagined/preferred visual size was
still influenced by the assumed size of the object. Finally, the miniatures experiment
(E4) also speaks to the issue of task-demands. Observers were told that the images
were pictures of miniatures for an architectural model, i.e. very small in real-world
size. Surely as a participant, one might feel as if they should select smaller sizes.
However, smaller than what? The observers were not the same as those who did El.
If there was no common understanding about the preferred visual size of a typically-
sized car, they would not know how to make a toy car smaller. While none of these
analyses and experiments perfectly address the issue of demand characteristics (and
indeed, E5 points to the fact that other factors beyond assumed size and framing mod-
ulate the accessed visual size), the combined data from all the experiments strongly
point to a role that the canonical visual size depends on the assumed size of the object
in the world. The results of the drawing task (El) are the strongest evidence of this
point, as this experiment is least subject to task demand characteristics, and also
provides the clearest support that canonical visual size is a relative statistic between
the size of the object and its surrounding space.
Relationship between canonical visual size and real-world view-
ing
Experience typically arises in the real-world in which 3-dimensional geometry con-
strains the distributions of visual sizes that are likely for different sized objects. How
do the canonical size for real-world objects compare to typical viewing distances? To
explore this question, we first need to obtain typical viewing distances for real-world
objects and thus what the corresponding visual angle is in one's visual field. Hubbard,
Kall, & Baird (1989) obtained estimates of the typical distance of interaction for a
range of everyday objects, which can be converted into visual angle measurements
(from 1.5 degrees for a 3 cm object like a coin, to 25 degrees for a 4m object like
a giraffe). Next, our data suggest that canonical sizes are not specified in absolute
visual angles but are instead relative to a frame of space. Thus, in order to see if
the visual size subtended by objects at their typical viewing distance is the same as
the canonical visual size, one needs to specify what the "frame" is during real-world
viewing. One intuitive possibility for the frame of real-world viewing is the whole
visual field. However, with a 180-degree hemisphere as the frame, the corresponding
visual size ratios at typical viewing distances are all much smaller that the canonical
visual size ratios we observed in the present data. Another possibility is to use extent
of the mind's eye as a proxy for the useable visual field and frame. The estimation
varies between 20 to 60 degrees (Kosslyn, 1978; Hubbard & Baird, 1988; Hubbard,
Kall, & Baird, 1989), with the larger estimates obtained when estimating over-flow
distance of real-world objects. With a 60 degree estimate as the frame, typical visual
size ratios would be between 3% for the coin to 42% for the giraffe. These estimated
ratios are similar to the imagined ratios observed in the present data (see Figure 9).
Of course, this speculation should be taken lightly as assumptions have been made
about the size of the real-world frame and the accuracy of subjective reports of typical
viewing distances. More work is required to integrate the canonical sizes found on
the computer screen and drawn pages with the statistics of visual experience in the
real world.
Finally, Hubbard, Kall, & Baird, (1989) have some evidence suggesting that there
may be systematic differences between sizes arising from imagery vs. perceptual
processes. For example, in their study, observers imagined bird's nests an average
distance of - 1 m while the average typical viewing distance was - 6 m. In fact,
when Hubbard, Kall, & Baird had observers imagine rods (unfamiliar objects) of a
prespecified length, and then estimate their distance to the rod, they found that the
relationship between size and viewing distance was less noisy than with familiar ob-
jects. These data suggest that canonical visual size may be derived not only from
the distribution of visual experience, but also from structural or geometric properties
of the object (e.g. bird's nests are rarely seen up close but the canonical visual size
may be more similar to an object of similar size, such as a football, even though
the distributions of visual experience with these objects are likely quite different).
Future studies are required to distinguish between these hypotheses; as with canon-
ical perspective, likely both visual experience and structural geometric factors are
involved.
Familiar Size as a Depth Cue
Existing knowledge about the size of objects in the world can serve as a cue to depth-
this is typically referred to as the familiar size cue. For example, in a classic study by
Ittelson (1951), observers had to judge the distance to different monocularly viewed
playing cards, where unbeknownst to the observers, all the cards were presented at
the same distance but some playing cards were either three-quarters or one-and-a-half
times the size of a normal playing card. The larger playing cards were estimated to
be closer to the observer, such that a normal card at the reported distance would
match the visual size of the card. Similar results were found for the smaller playing
cards, estimated to be father away. These data show that when objects that have a
familiar or known size, seeing them at a particular visual angle influences the perceived
distance (see also Baird, 1962; Yonas et al., 1982).
Familiar size and canonical visual size are not the same: familiar size means
that observers know the real-world size of objects in the world (e.g. expressed in
meters). This is knowledge about an object property, i.e. object-centered information.
In contrast, canonical visual size indicates that there is a privileged visual size for
perceiving objects (where the visual size is expressed as a ratio between the visual
angle of an object relative to a frame). Canonical perspectives and canonical visual
sizes provide evidence that existing object representations contain specific information
about perspective and visual size, which are viewer-centered properties. For example,
at one extreme it might be argued that existing object representations are stored at
one particular perspective and one particular scale. Alternatively, likely each object's
representation has stored views from a range of perspectives and scales, with some
perspectives and scales being more probable or preferred than others.
What, then, is the relationship between familiar size as a depth cue and canonical
visual size? Both involve the observer having knowledge about the real-world size
of the object. In the first case, observers can use the familiar size of an object to
estimate its distance (e.g. Epstein 1963; 1965; Epstein & Baratz, 1964; Ittelson,
1951; Ono, 1969). In the case of canonical visual size, when observers access existing
object representations in order to draw, imagine, or make a perceptual preference, the
visual size that is outputted depends on the assumed size of the object. Combining
these two ideas, one empirical prediction is that observers might be better able to use
familiar size information to make accurate distance estimates if the familiar object at
its canonical visual size within the real-world viewing frame.
Conclusion
Akin to studies on canonical perspective, we provide evidence that existing object
representations also have canonical visual sizes, which depend on the assumed size of
the object in the world relative to a frame of space. Both perspective and visual size
are spatial dimensions that are under the control of an active observer-in this sense
canonical views connect physical objects to a viewer in an environment. In fact, if
one combines canonical perspective at the canonical visual size, this object knowledge
specifies the optimal place in three-dimensional space from which to view an object.
One intriguing possibility is that an active observer might use this information to
reflexively navigate to a better view of objects in the world (e.g., Merleau-Ponty,
1962).
Appendix
Figure 10: Sample objects used in Experiments 3, 4 and 5 are shown here, so the
level of object detail and resolution of the images is more apparent.
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Chapter 3
A Familiar Size Stroop Effect:
Real-world size is an automatic
property of object representation
When we recognize an object, do we automatically know how big it is in the world?
We employed a Stroop-like paradigm, in which two objects were presented at different
visual sizes on the screen. Observers were faster to indicate which was bigger or
smaller on the screen when the known size of the objects was congruent with the
visual size than when it was incongruent-demonstrating a familiar-size Stroop effect.
Critically, the known size of the objects was irrelevant for the task. In a second
experiment, participants learned a rule to categorize novel objects as big or small,
but these stimuli did not drive a Stroop effect, indicating that automatic known size
processing is not cognitively penetrable. These results show that people access the
familiar size of objects without the intention of doing so, demonstrating that real-
world size is an automatic property of object representation.
Introduction
Every object in the world has a physical size which is intrinsic to how we interact with
it (Gibson, 1979): we pick up small objects like coins and berries with our fingers,
and we orient our body to bigger objects like chairs and tables. When we learn about
objects, our experience is necessarily situated in a three-dimensional context. Thus,
the real-world size of objects may be a basic and fundamental property of visual
object representation (Konkle & Oliva, 2011) and of object concepts (Setti et al,
2009; Sereno & O'Donnel, 2009; Rubinsten & Henik, 2002).
One of the most fundamental properties of object representation is category in-
formation: we rapidly and obligatorily recognize objects and can name them at their
basic-level category (Grill-Spector & Kanwisher, 2006; Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot, 1996).
This indicates that when visual information about an object is processed, it auto-
matically makes contact with category information. Here we examined whether our
knowledge of an object's real-world size is also accessed automatically: as soon as you
see a familiar object, do you also know how big it typically is the world?
We designed a Stroop-like paradigm to test whether the known size of the object
is automatically accessed when you recognize a familiar object. In what is commonly
referred to as the "Stroop effect" (Stroop, 1935; see MacLeod, 1999), observers are
faster to name the ink color of a presented word when the word is congruent with
the ink color than when it is incongruent (the word "pink" in pink ink or green ink).
Even though the word itself is irrelevant to the task, fluent readers automatically
and obligatorily read the word, even at a cost to performance. Stroop paradigms
have been used as a tool to understand how we automatically draw meaning from
words, and this has been extended to understand how we draw meaning from pictures
(MacLeod, 1999).
In our familiar-size Stroop paradigm, we presented two objects at two different
sizes on the screen and observers made a judgment about the visual size of the object
("which is smaller/bigger on the screen?"). Here, the identity of the objects and
their known size are irrelevant to the task. Critically, the known size of the objects
could be congruent or incongruent with the visual size (Figure la). If the known size
of objects speeds or slows performance on this basic visual size task, this would be
strong evidence that as soon as you recognize an object, you automatically access its
known size as well.
Experiment 1: Familiar Object Stroop Task
Method
Participants
18 participants (age 18-35) gave informed consent and completed the experiment.
Apparatus
Observers sat 57 cm from a computer screen (29x39.5 cm) and viewed stimuli pre-
sented using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).
Design
On each trial, two images of real-world objects were presented side by side, with one
at a visually large size and the other at a visually small size. The task was to make a
judgment about the visual size of the object ("which is visually smaller/bigger on the
screen?") as fast as possible while maintaining high accuracy. In congruent trials,
the known size of the familiar objects matched the visual size. For example, an alarm
clock would be presented small while a horse was presented big. In incongruent trials,
this was reversed and the horse was small on the screen while the alarm clock was
big on the screen (Figure la).
Each trial started with a fixation cross for 700ms, then the two objects were pre-
sented until the observer responded. Correct responses were followed by a 900ms
interval before the next trial began. Incorrect responses were followed by error feed-
back and a 5 second interval before the next trial began. The visual sizes were set so
that the diagonal extent of the bounding box around each object was either 35% or
60% of the screen height, for visually small and big, respectively (11 and 18 degrees
visual angle). This method of setting the visual size takes into account variations in
aspect ratio across objects (Konkle & Oliva, 2011; Kosslyn, 1978).
Observers completed both tasks (which is visually smaller/larger?) with the order
of the tasks counterbalanced across observers. The 36 big objects and 36 small objects
were counterbalanced to appear in both congruent/incongruent trials with the correct
answer on the left/right side of the screen, across smaller/larger visual size tasks
(see also supporting information). There were 576 total trials (288 congruent / 288
incongruent).
Results
Incorrect trials and trials in which the reaction time (RT) was shorter than 200ms or
longer than 1500ms were excluded, removing 3.8% of the trials. One participant was
excluded due to a computer error.
Overall, reaction times for incongruent trials were significantly longer than for
congruent trials (38ms, SEM=6ms; Cohen's d=1.5; 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA,
main effect of congruency: F(1,67) = 18.2,p = 0.001; Figure 1b). All 17 observers
showed an effect in the expected direction. This Stroop effect was also reliably ob-
served in both visual size tasks, with paired t-tests showing significant Stroop effects
(visually smaller task: 58ms, SEM=12ms; t(16) = 4.98,p = 0.0001; visually larger
task: 17ms, SEM=4ms, t(16) = 4.401,p = 0.0004).
Additionally, people were faster to judge which was bigger on the screen than
which was smaller (main effect of task: F(1, 67) = 14.6, p = 0.001), consistent with
the classic finding of faster RTs for visually larger items (Osaka, 1976; Payne 1967;
Sperandio et al., 2009). The magnitude of the Stroop effect was significantly different
across these tasks (task x congruency interaction: F(1, 67) = 8.9, p = 0.009), with a
larger effect when people were judging which object was smaller on the screen.
These results demonstrate a familiar-size Stroop effect: people are slower to com-
plete a basic visual judgment when the familiar size of the object is incongruent with
the visual size.
One account of these data is that our familiar size knowledge arises from exten-
sive visual experience with objects in the world, and this expertise is required to
automatically activate familiar size. However, an alternate explanation is that the
interference between known size and visual size arises only at a very conceptual level.
For example, if this effect is cognitively penetrable (Pylyshyn, 1999), then it would




Figure 1: Known size Stroop task with familiar objects. A) Two familiar objects
were presented side-by-side, and observers indicated which object was smaller or
larger on the screen. The known size of the objects could either be congruent or
incongruent with the presented size. Congruent and incongruent example displays
are shown. B) The left panel shows overall reaction times for congruent trials (black
bars) and incongruent trials (white bars), plotted for each task (smaller/larger visual
size judgment) and combined across tasks. The right panel shows the difference
between incongruent and congruent reaction times (Stroop effect). Error bars reflect
±1 SEM.
be sufficient to simply instruct people that some objects are big and others are small
in order to observe a Stroop effect. We test this possibility in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2: One-Shot Learning Stroop Task
We introduced participants to novel bi-color objects from a "block world", where
observers were told that all objects in this world fall into two classes: Big objects
made out of blue and red blocks, and small objects made of yellow and green blocks.
Here we taught observers a simple rule with minimal experience, to see if this fact-
based knowledge was sufficient to drive a Stroop effect. If observers show a Stroop
effect on objects whose size is based on a rule, this would suggest that known size
can be rapidly incorporated into our object knowledge. Alternatively, if observers do
not show a Stroop effect, this would suggest that more experience with the objects is
required for automatic known size processing.
Method
Participants
17 new participants (between ages 18-35) gave informed consent and completed the
experiment.
Procedure
Observers were introduced to two example objects in the testing room, one small
(approx. 120cm x 75cm) and one large (approx. 30cm x 18cm), depicted in Figure
2a. Participants were told that these were example objects from a block-world, where
all blue-red block objects were big and all yellow-green block objects were small.
Observers completed drawing and change-detection tasks to expose them to the ex-
ample objects as well as the pictures of the bi-colored objects presented on the screen
(see the supporting information). Following this familiarization phase, which lasted
approximately 30 minutes, observers completed a block-world Stroop task.
Design
The trial design was as in Experiment 1, except that pictures of bi-color block objects
were presented (Figure 2b). Each observer saw 16 unique yellow-green objects and 16
unique blue-red objects. These were presented each 32 times (congruent/incongruent
trial type x correct answer on left/right side of screen x smaller/larger task x 4
repetitions), yielding 512 total trials (256 congruent / 256 incongruent).
The color-size rule was counterbalanced across observers (see Figure S1 in the
supporting information). Across observers each item appeared in both blue-red or
yellow-green, as both an implied big and implied small object, ensuring that object
shapes were fully counterbalanced across conditions.
Results
Incorrect trials and trials in which the reaction time (RT) was shorter than 200ms or
longer than 1500ms were excluded, removing 3.7% of the trials.
Overall, we observed no difference in reaction time between congruent and incon-
gruent trials (-4ms, SEM=3ms; Cohen's d=-0.3; 2x2 ANOVA, main effect of con-
gruency: F(1, 67) = 1.7, p = 0.21; Figure 2c). The Stroop effect was not present
in either task (smaller task: -12ms, SEM=6ms; larger task: 4ms, SEM=7ms; task x
congruency interaction: F(1, 67) = 1.9, p = 0.19). Of the 17 observers, 7 showed an
effect in the expected direction and 10 showed an effect in the opposite direction. A
power analysis indicated this study had very high power (>99%) to detect a stroop
effect of similar magnitude as in Experiment 1, and high power (83%) to detect an
effect of half the size. At a power of 99% this study could detect an effect size of
d=1.0 (-12 ms Stroop effect).
To compare the Stroop effect between experiments, we conducted 2x2 ANOVA
with familiar/bi-color objects as a between-subject factor, and congruency as a within-
subject factor. There was a significant main effect of congruency (F(1, 67) = 25.1, p <
0.001) and a significant interaction between experiments and congruency (F(1, 67) =
36.7,p < 0.001). That is, people in the familiar object experiment showed a Stroop















Figure 2: One-shot learning Stroop task. A) Observers were familiarized with one
bi-color big object and one bi-color small object, and were told that all big objects
were made of blue and red blocks, and all small objects were made of yellow-and
green blocks (counterbalanced across observers). B) During the Stroop task, two
bi-color objects were presented side-by-side, and observers indicated which object
was smaller or larger on the screen. The implied real-world size of the objects could
either be congruent or incongruent with the presented size. An example display that
is congruent with the familiarization in (A) is shown. C) The left panel shows overall
reaction times for congruent trials (black bars) and incongruent trials (white bars),
plotted for each task (smaller/larger visual size judgment) and combined across tasks.
The right panel shows the difference between incongruent and congruent reaction







effect (38ms, SEM=6) while people in the one-shot learning experiment did not (-
4ms, SEM=3). Two-sample t-tests confirmed this result (t(32) = 6.06,p < 0.0001).
Further, there was no difference in overall reaction time between the two experiments
(F(1, 67) = 0.4, p = 0.53), indicating that across experiments participants were not
any faster or slower overall to make visual size judgments.
These across-experiment comparisons show that there is a robust Stroop effect
with familiar objects that was not detected for stimuli whose real-world size is implied
based on an explicit rule. Even though observers know this rule with certainty, the
data show that this fact-based knowledge was not sufficient to generate a detectable
Stroop effect within the reasonable power of the current design. This suggests that
in order for known size to have a strong and automatic impact performance, more
extensive experience and learning is required.
General Discussion
A hallmark of our object recognition system is that object processing automatically
connects with stored knowledge, allowing for rapid recognition (Thorpe, Fize, & Mar-
lot, 1996). Nearly as soon as we are able to detect an object, we can also name it at
the basic-category level (Grill-Spector & Kanwisher, 2006; Mack et al., 2008). Here
we show that even when object information is completely task-irrelevant, familiar size
gives rise to a Stroop effect. These results suggest that we not only identify objects
automatically, but we also access their real-world size automatically.
A previous study used similar displays as in Figure la, but observers judged which
object was bigger in the world (Srinivas, 1996). They also found a Stroop effect, with
observers faster to make a known size judgment when the visual size was congruent.
Thus, Srinivas demonstrated that a perceptual feature (visual size) influenced the
speed of a conceptual/semantic judgment (which is bigger in the world), which makes
sense as visual size may be a route to accessing known size more quickly. The current
study demonstrates the complementary effect: known size facilitates/interferes with a
visual size judgment, revealing the speed and automaticity with which task-irrelevant
semantic information is brought to bear on a very basic perceptual task. Together
these results speak to the integral nature of perceptual and semantic features, demon-
strating a direct and automatic association between known size and visual size.
What is the underlying relationship between known size and visual size that gives
rise to a Stroop effect? One possibility is that interference occurs at a relatively high-
level concept, arising from a common abstract concept of size. However, the data
from the one-shot learning experiment are not wholly consistent with pure conceptual
interference. Had we found that teaching people a simple size rule led to a Stroop
effect, this would be strong evidence supporting a more abstract locus of interference.
However, we observed that simply being able to state whether something is big or
small with minimal experience did not lead to strong interference with visual size
judgments. Instead, the data imply that the association between an object and its
known size has to be learned with repeated experience before it can automatically
interfere with a visual size task.
A second possibility is that interference in this task arises in more perceptual
stages of processing. Consistent with this idea, a number of researchers have claimed
that stored information about real-world size is represented in a perceptual or analog
format (Moyer, 1973; Pavio, 1975; Rubinsten & Henik, 2002). Further, objects have
a canonical visual size, proportional to the log of their familiar size, where smaller
objects like alarm clocks are preferred at smaller visual sizes, and larger objects like
horses are preferred at larger visual sizes (Konkle & Oliva, 2011; Linsen et al., in
press). On this more perceptual account of interference, in the congruent condition
both objects have a better match to stored representations which include visual size
information, facilitating and/or interfering with visual size judgments.
Certainly, these two accounts of the familiar-size Stroop effect are not mutually
exclusive. It is likely that there is interference at multiple levels of representation,
from more perceptual ones (realized in visual-size biases) to more conceptual ones
(e.g. semantic facts that a horse is big). The present data do suggest, however, that
strong interference effects are not granted in one shot by learning a rule, but instead
must be grounded in repeated perceptual experience. This mirrors the results for
the classic stroop effect, where intermediate or fluent reading ability is required to
show interference with color naming (Comalli 1962; MacLeod, 1991). Importantly,
regardless of the sources of interference between known size and visual size, the present
data clearly show that the known size of objects is automatically activated when an
object is recognized.
Supporting Information
Experiment 1: Aspect Ratio Counterbalancing
Pictures of real-world objects vary in their aspect ratio, which influences the apparent
visual size of the object (e.g. a wide object tends to look smaller than a tall object,
even if they are equated on other dimensions such as the diagonal extent or fit inside
similar bounding circles). To account for this factor, the 36 big and 36 small object
stimuli were paired by aspect ratio in advance. Matching the aspect ratio of the two
objects removes uncertainty about how to compare the size of objects with different
aspect ratios.
In the first half of the experiment, all trials contained pairs of objects that were
matched in aspect ratio ("matched pairs"). Thus all observers saw these same pairs.
Each pair was fully counterbalanced, appearing in congruent/incongruent trials, with
the correct answer on the left/right of the screen, in both bigger/smaller visual size
tasks.
To double the number of trials to increase power, we pseudo-randomly paired the
big and small objects, and this pairing was different for each observer. Here, we
ensured that if a tall big object was paired with a wide small object (e.g. A door
and harmonica), then there would also be a tall small object paired with a wide big
object (e.g. A bottle and a train). Thus, the aspect ratio of two items on any given
display can be different, but across trials the ratio of aspect rations was balanced
across congruent and incongruent condition. Again each of these "pseudo-pairs" was
fully counterbalanced.
Both of these methods of stimulus selection ensure that the aspect ratio (or ra-
tio of aspect ratios) was completed balanced across congruent and incongruent trial
types. Thus, any differences in reaction times between these two conditions cannot
be driven by effects of aspect ratio on perceived visual size. Within each part of the
experiment (matched trials, paired trials), observers completed both visual judgment
tasks (which is visually smaller/larger?) with the order of the tasks counterbalanced
across observers.
Results. We analyzed the reaction times for matched trials in the first half of the
experiment and paired-trials in the second half of the experiment, and found consis-
tent convergent results. For the matched pairs, reaction times were again significantly
longer on incongruent than congruent trials (mean RT difference=34.0, SEM=8.7;
t(16) = 3.94, p = 0.001), and errors were more frequent in incongruent vs. congruent
trials (t(16) = 3.84,p = 0.001). Similarly, Stroop effects both in RT and errors were
observed in the pseudo-pairs (mean RT difference=28.6, SEM=8.7; RT difference:
t(16) = 3.29,p = 0.0046; Error difference: t(16) = 3.61,p = 0.0023). There was no
difference in the overall reaction time (t(16) = 0.32, p = 0.75) or magnitude of the
Stroop effect (t(16) = 0.53, p = 0.60) across these stimulus pairing conditions.
Experiment 2: Familiarization Methods
To ensure that observers were familiarized with the reference objects, participants
completed two tasks. For the first task, observers were given a sheet of paper, a
pencil, and markers, and had 3 minutes to create a colored drawing of each reference
object. For the second task, participants were given 10 seconds to study the reference
object, after which they closed their eyes and one or more blocks were added to the
object. They then had three guesses to indicate which blocks were added and were
given feedback. Added blocks were always of the same colors as the reference objects.
Observers completed three change-detection trials per reference object.
We next familiarized the participants to pictures of other objects from block world,
presented on the screen. Each trial, the participant was instructed to turn and look
at the big or small reference object, after which they looked back at the screen and
a picture of a new object from block world presented. This picture was always of
the same size class (e.g. a "small" object also made out of green and yellow blocks).
Observers' task was to determine if the depicted object was slightly taller or slightly
shorter than the reference object, were it in the world along side the reference object.
Each depicted object was presented for 500ms, which did not allow sufficient time
for observers to count the number of rows of blocks. The 32 novel bi-color object
pictures were presented in random order. This task ensured that participants were
familiarized with each depicted object on the screen, and further required them to
conceive of its physical size in the world. Combined, these familiarization tasks took
30 minutes to complete.
Experiment 2: Counterbalancing
Task: Which is smaller/larger on the screen?
Congruent / Incongruent
Supplementary Figure 1. To counterbalance for the pairing of color and known size,
some observers learned that big objects were yellow-green (left image) while others
learned that big objects were red-blue (right image). Thus depending on the famil-
iarization, the same display fell into either the congruent or incongruent condition
(center image).
Chapter 4
The representation of objects in
ventral temporal cortex depends
on real-world sizel
While previous work has shown systematic organization for specific object categories
with functional selectivity (faces, houses, bodies), the large-scale organization of other
object categories with more distributed cortical representations remains unknown.
Here we find that object representations can be differentiated by their real-world size
in adult human occipito-temporal cortex. In a functional neuroimaging experiment,
observers were shown pictures of known big and small objects presented at the same
retinal size. A region in the parahippocampal gyrus was preferentially active for
big objects, while an adjacent region in inferior temporal cortex was more active for
small objects, with a mirrored organization along the lateral surface. These regions
show known-size preferences across different object categories and retinal sizes, and
during mental imagery. The systematic medial to lateral organization of big and small
objects suggests that real-world object size is an organizing dimension of distributed
object representation.
Introduction
One of the most robust results in visual neuroscience is the systematic response of
a large section of ventral temporal cortex to objects and shapes (Grill-Spector &
'This chapter is under review as Konkle, T. & Oliva, A. (2011). The representation of objects in
ventral temporal cortex depends on real-world size.
Malach, 2004; Milner & Goodale, 1995; Ungerleider et al., 1982). How object repre-
sentations are organized within this cortex is an active research area, with evidence
for category-selective regions for only a few object categories (faces, bodies, letter
strings; Cohen et al., 2000; Downing et al., 2001; Kanwisher et al., 1997; McCarthy
et al., 1997), and for partially or fully distributed representations for all other ob-
jects, reflected in distinct and reliable multi-voxel patterns of activity (Carlson et
al., 2003; Cox & Savoy, 2003; Haxby et al., 2001; Norman et al., 2006; O'toole et
al., 2005). While it has been suggested that multi-voxel patterns of activity reflect
inhomogeneities of category selectivity at the sub-voxel level (e.g. for orientation
in VI see Kamitani & Tong, 2005), more recent analyses have shown that patterns
of activity are reliable even with increased spatial smoothing (Op de Beeck, 2010),
can generalize across subjects(Shinkareva et al., 2008), and likely are capitalizing on
large-scale organization (Freeman et al., 2011). These results indicate that there is
a systematic organization to these distributed object activation patterns that we do
not yet understand.
One intrinsic and often overlooked property of an object is its physical size in
the world (Cate et al., 2011; Konkle & Oliva, 2011; Mullally & Maguire, 2011):
Small objects, like blueberries or paperclips, are held in the fingers or hands, are
manipulable, tend to have rounder shapes, are typically experienced with a steep
head angle at small retinal sizes (<3 degrees at arms length). Big objects like chairs,
tables, or even houses, are interacted with by body movement, are more navigationally
relevant, tend to be boxier, and are typically experienced with a head angle more
parallel with the horizon and subtend large retinal sizes (~30 degrees for a car at
10 m; see also Haldane, 1928). Thus, the size of objects in the world influences how
an observer interacts with objects and leads to systematic biases in visual experience
with each object category, influencing distributions of experienced shape, features,
and eccentricity.
In the current study, we investigated if the known size of real-world objects was an
organizing dimension of object representation. Here we focused on the representations
of everyday objects excluding faces, animals, and classically-defined tools. Using a
large stimulus set of specific real-world objects, we examined if any neural regions
showed differential activity to big versus small objects, independent of retinal size.
Our findings showed a consistent organization of big and small objects in medial to
lateral regions of ventral temporal cortex in the left-hemisphere. A similar mirrored
pattern of organization was also observed along the lateral surface. Our results suggest
that the real-world size of objects is a systematic property that predicts large-scale
patterns of activity for objects in ventral visual cortex.
Results
Differential responses to big and small objects
To examine if objects of big and small real-world sizes were systematically represented
in different regions of cortex, we conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging
experiment in which images of isolated big objects (e.g. car, piano) and isolated
small objects (e.g. strawberry, safety pin) were presented at the same retinal size on
the screen to 12 observers. (Fig. la; Experiment 1). We conducted a whole-brain
random effects analysis to identify regions preferentially active to known small objects
or to known big objects (P < 0.001, cluster threshold > 100mm3 ). Along the ventral
surface of the brain, a bilateral region of the parahippocampal gyrus was more active
to big relative to small objects (henceforth labeled as "BigV" or big-ventral region),
while a left-lateralized adjacent region in the inferior temporal sulcus extending to the
fusiform gyrus was more active to small relative to big objects (henceforth "SmallA"
or small-anterior region, Fig. 1b). Along the lateral surface, a more posterior small-
preference region was observed ("SmallP" or small-posterior), with a big-preference
region in the right transoccipital sulcus ("BigD", or big-dorsal; Table 1).
These regions were observed reliably in single subjects (Fig. 1b; Table 1), with a
SmallA region present in 9 of 12 participants, a SmallP region present in all 12 par-
ticipants, and a bilateral BigV region present in 10 of 12 participants (FDR < 0.05,
cluster threshold> 100mm 3 ). The SmallP region was bilateral in half of the partici-
pants. The Big-Dorsal region was less reliably observed at the single-subject level (5
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Figure 1: (A) Example objects of known small and big sizes. All images were pre-
sented at the same retinal size. The stimulus set contained 200 small and 200 big
objects. (B) Contrasts of known big vs. small objects. Upper Panel: Results of
a random-effects analysis, small big contrast, (n = 12, P < 0.002, cluster thresh-
old=10, see Online Methods), plotted on the brain of one sample subject (sagital
section, x=-42, coronal section, y=-42). The bilateral region with preference for big
objects on the ventral surface is shown (BigV). Two small-preference regions were
found, one anterior (SmallA) and one posterior (SmallP). Lower panel: These regions
of interest are shown for 4 participants (12 of 12 showed a SmallP region; 10 of 12
showed a SmallA region; 10 of 12 showed a bilateral Big region).
Region n X Y Z Peak T
L Inferior Temporal SmallA 9/12 -42 -46 -11 6.0
L Lateral Occipital SmallP 12/12 -42 -61 -2 5.9
L Parahippocampal BigV 10/12 -30 -40 -5 -6.5
R Parahippocampal BigV 10/12 30 -40 -2 -6.4
R Transoccipital Big-Dorsal 5/12 12 -73 40 -7.0
Table 1. Talairach coordinates of the peak voxel from the group random effects
analysis.
of 12) with a more variable position across subjects, and it was thus not included for
further analysis. For all subsequent experiments and for additional participants, this
experiment was used as a localizer to independently define these regions, and only
responses in the left-hemisphere are reported as there were no differences between the
responses in the left and right hemisphere.
To estimate the effect size within these regions, 8 new participants were shown
two runs of the big and small object localizer. Regions of interest were estimated
from the first run for each subject and the magnitude of activation to big and small
objects was computed in these regions using data from the second run using an ROI
GLM. All 8 participants showed a SmallP and SmallA region in the left hemisphere,
and 7 of 8 showed a BigV region in the left-hemisphere, providing a replication of
Experiment 1. These regions showed differential responses that were 1.5 to 1.7 times
higher for objects of the preferred size relative to objects of the non-preferred size
(see Supplementary Fig. 1; Supplementary Table 1). Both regions also showed a
significant above-baseline response to objects of the non-preferred size (Supplemen-
tary Table 1). Thus, these objects generally activate a large swath along the ventral
surface of cortex, and here we show big objects have a peak of activity on the medial
aspect while small objects have a peak of activity on the lateral aspect.
Tolerance to retinal size changes
Ventral temporal cortex has been well-characterized as having object-selective re-
sponses that are tolerant to changes in retinal size, position, and viewpoint-a hall-
mark of high-level object representations (DiCarlo & Cox, 2007; Grill-Spector et
al., 1999; Sawamura et al., 2005; Vuilleumier et al., 2002). Consistent with this,
in Experiment 2, we manipulated the retinal size at which the objects were pre-
sented, and found that all of these regions showed more activity to objects of the
preferred known size independent of retinal size (Fig. 2; main effect of known size:
BigV: F(1,23) = 51.5,p = 0.001; SmallA: F(1,23) = 85.8,p < 0.001; SmallP:
F(1, 31) = 317.7, p < 0.001). In the BigV region, there was also an effect of the
retinal size, with a stronger response to stimuli presented at retinally large compared
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Figure 2: Retinal Size Manipulation Results. A) Objects of known small and big
sizes were presented at small and large retinal sizes on the screen. B) Activations in
independently-localized BigV, SmallA, and SmallP, and anatomically-defined early
visual cortex regions (Calcarine) in left hemisphere were measured with ROI GLMs
and the beta weights for the four conditions are shown. Error bars reflect t 1. S.E.M.
The BigV region showed effects of both the known size and the retinal size, while the
small regions showed only preference for the known size of objects with no modulation
to retinal size. The early visual control region showed modulation by the retinal size,
with no effect of known size of the object.
to retinally small sizes (main effect of retinal size: Big-L: F(1, 23) = 14.8, p = 0.012;
SmallA: F(1, 23) = 0.6, p = 0.46; SmallP: F(1, 31) = 5.0, p = 0.06). Thus, the BigV
region shows a large retinal size preference for both known small and known big ob-
jects, suggesting that the features it represents are not fully scale-invariant and are
enhanced by peripheral input (Arcaro et al., 2009; Levy et al., 2001; Levy et al., 2004).
As a control region, we examined the response in an anatomically-defined region of
early visual cortex along the calcarine sulcus, and found more activity for retinally
larger images than retinally smaller images, with no effects of known size (Calcarine:
retinal size: F(1, 27) = 22.8,p = 0.003; known size: F(1, 27) = 2.5,p = 0.16).
The retinal size manipulation also serves as a control for the distribution of low-
level features in early retinotopic areas (Levy et al., 2001). One potential concern
is that pictures of big and small objects presented at the same retinal size may
give rise to an uneven feature distribution presented to early foveal and peripheral
retinotopic cortex. However, both big and small regions showed tolerance to retinal
size variation, which varies the features presented to early areas. Thus, any uneven
feature distribution stimulating foveal versus peripheral retinotopic cortex cannot
explain away the activity in the big and small regions.
Mental imagery of big and small objects
Mental imagery requires observers to draw on stored knowledge about the visual
form of an object (Mechelli et al., 2004). For example, mental imagery of faces and
places have been shown to activate face- and place-selective visually responsive regions
(O'Craven & Kanwisher, 2000). More recently it has been demonstrated that even the
multi-voxel pattern of activation across ventral visual cortex for tools, foods, faces,
and buildings is similar from perception to imagery (Reddy et al., 2010; Stokes et al.,
2009). These results suggest that ventral temporal cortex contains stored information
about the visual appearance of different kinds of objects, which is activated similarly
during mental imagery and perception. Thus, when imagining different real-world
objects, we predicted that big objects would preferentially activate medial ventral
cortex while small objects would preferentially activate lateral ventral cortex.
To test this, names of objects were presented aurally to a new set of observers,
whose task was to form a mental image of each object (Experiment 3). Afterwards
they were presented with known big and small objects visually (as in Experiment 1), to
independently localize the big and small regions of interest in each subject. Consistent
with our predictions, when these participants imagined big and small objects, the big
and small regions showed more activity to objects with the preferred known size (Fig.
2; BigV : t(6) = 4.0,p = 0.007; SmallA: t(7) = 2.4,p = 0.048; SmallP marginal:
t(7) = 1.8,p = 0.107). These results also serve as a control for any concerns that our
previous results were driven by pictorial artifacts of the stimuli: here, any perceptual
features instantiated via imagery processes are meaningfully tied to object concepts
and are not driven by unintentional feed-forward stimulus artifacts.
Size Processing versus Stored Knowledge
One potential interpretation of these data is that the magnitude of activity in these
regions is related to the size the observer thinks the object is in the world. For
example, the bigger one conceives of an object, the more it will drive activity in the
big region and the less it will drive activity in the small regions, independent of the
object's identity. To test this, observers in Experiment 3 also imagined the big and
small objects at an atypical size, e.g. a tiny piano (the size of a matchbox), or a giant
apple (the size of car). If activity in these regions is driven by the conceived size of the
object, then in these size-violation conditions the response in these regions should be
reversed. Alternatively, if activity is driven by activating stored representations of the
visual form of big and small objects, then the big and small regions should respond
similarly between the typical size conditions and the size-violation conditions.
When observers imagined big and small objects in the size-violation conditions,
we still observed that the big and small regions showed more activity to objects
with the preferred known size. That is, imagining an apple the size of a car still
activated the small-preference regions more than imagining a tiny piano (see Fig.
3; SmallA: t(7) = 2.6,p = 0.036; SmallP: t(7) = 2.4,p = 0.048; BigV trending:
t(6) = 1.7,p = 0.136). Thus activity in these regions do not reflect the conceived
size of the imagined object; these regions are not performing a size computation
independent of object identity.
The big region had a less pronounced preference for big relative to small objects
when those objects were imagined at the wrong sizes (marginally significant inter-
action: F(1, 27) = 5.9, p = 0.051). This suggests that this region may in part be
reflecting the physical size an observer imagines the object to be. However, a more
parsimonious account of this data is that the big region also has a peripheral prefer-
ence, as observed in our retinal size manipulation experiment (Fig. 2). If observers
imagine giant apples at a large retinal size and tiny pianos at a small retinal size (see
Konkle & Oliva, 2011), then this would give rise to the results observed here. Consis-
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Figure 3: Mental Imagery Results. Activations in independently-localized BigV,
SmallA, and SmallP regions in left hemisphere are shown. Orange bars show data for
imagined objects known to be small (e.g. strawberries) and blue bars show data for
imagined objects known to be big (e.g. pianos). (A) Bars with solid borders reflect
conditions where observers imagined typically-sized objects. (B) Bars with dashed
borders reflect conditions where the objects were imagined at atypical sizes. These
results show activity in these regions is driven more by the known size of the typical
object than by the conceived size of the object.
tent with this interpretation, the small regions did not have any strong modulations
by retinal size, and did not show an interaction in the size-violation conditions.
Organization of Category Information
In all experiments reported so far, objects were presented in blocks by the known
size of the object. Thus one potential concern is that only a few of the objects (e.g.
monuments or tools; Aguirre et al., 1998; Chao et al., 1999) drive the response in
these big and small preference regions. In Experiment 3 we presented observers with
object exemplars blocked by category (e.g. 16 backpacks, 16 grills), allowing us to
estimate the response in these regions to each object category independently. These
object categories parametrically varied in known size on a log scale (Fig. 4a, see
Supplementary Methods and Supplementary Fig. 2; see also Konkle & Oliva, 2011).
The big and small regions showed a systematic modulation of overall activity
based on the real-world size of the object (Fig. 4b; BigV: F(15, 127) = 8.1, p < 0.001;
SmallA: F(15, 79) = 3.6,p < 0.001; SmallP: F(15, 127) = 3.9,p < 0.001). In the











Figure 4: Stimuli and results of the category blocks experiment. A) 16 different
categories of objects were presented in a blocked-design. An example stimulus from
each object category is shown, arranged by known size. These object categories
follow a logarithmic scaling along this dimension. B) GLMs were conducted in the
independently-defined regions-of-interest in each subject, with data for BigV, SmallA,
and SmallP regions in left-hemisphere shown. Each plot shows the average beta
values along the y-axis, computed for each category across subjects. The categories
are arranged along the x-axis by real-world size, as shown in (a), and the regression
line over the group data is shown. Error bars reflect ± 1. S.E.M. Multiple object
categories showed high responses in each region, with systematically more activity












big region, multiple categories of objects with a large real-world size significantly
activated this region, indicating the responses we observed in the first experiment
were not driven a select set of stimuli from particular categories. Similarly, the small
regions showed a high response to a variety of small object categories that are not
considered classical tools (Fig. 4a). We observed a relatively parametric modulation
of response in these regions as a function of known size, both when calculated on the
group averaged betas and also within single subjects (BigV: mean r = 0.51, t(7) =
8.1,p < 0.001; SmallP: mean r = -0.36,t(7) = -4.0,p < 0.005; SmallA: mean
r = -0.46, t(4) = -4.7, p = 0.01; see Methods, see Supplementary Table 2 for single
subject results). However, it is not the case that there is a clear linear mapping
between the log of known object size and the response of these regions. Nevertheless,
the data show that a variety of big object categories activate the big region, ruling
out any concerns that these regions were solely driven by specific categories in our
previous sets such as houses or monuments (Aguirre et al., 1998) or places (Epstein
& Kanwisher, 1998).
Discussion
Nearly all object categories besides faces, bodies, places, and letter strings, do not
have a spatially-contiguous and highly-selective cortical representation, but instead
activate a swath of ventral and lateral temporal cortex to varying degrees (Carlson
et al., 2003; Cox & Savoy, 2003; Haxby et al., 2001; Norman et al., 2006; O'toole
et al., 2005). The organizing dimensions of object representations within this cortex
have yet to be discovered. Here we show that object-responsive cortex has reliably
differential responses to known big and small objects, suggesting that the real-world
size of objects is a large-scale organizing dimension of object representation.
On the ventral surface, we observed a medial region responsive to big versus small
objects (BigV) and an adjacent lateral region more responsive to small versus big
objects (SmallA; see Fig. 5). Along the lateral surface of cortex, we observed another













Figure 5: Relationship of these regions to other well-characterized regions. A)
Functionally-localized regions from a single representative subject are shown on
an inflated brain. Inner, middle, and outer eccentricity rings are shown in light,
medium, and dark blue respectively (see Supplementary Methods). LOC and pFS
(objects>scrambled) are shown in yellow, FFA (faces>objects) is shown in pink, and
PPA and TOS (scenes>objects) are shown in green. The SmallA and SmallP regions
are shown in orange and the BigV and BigD region is shown in blue, also indicated
with white arrows. B) Axial slices from two different subjects (z=-3; z=-6). BigV
and SmallP regions are outlined in black, with voxels that overlapped with PPA and
LOC shown in the green and yellow, respectively.
SmallA
BigV PPA
region with preferential responses to big objects (BigD). The ventral activations were
reliable within and across observers and were localized with less than 10 minutes of
scanning. In subsequent experiments, we demonstrated that (i) these regions are more
responsive to objects of the preferred size independent of changes in retinal size, (ii)
these regions are activated during mental imagery of objects, both when imagining
typically-sized objects and objects at a non-normative size, and (iii) these regions are
not driven by a few specific categories but instead respond to many different object
categories, with a relatively parametric response to objects spanning the range of
real-world sizes.
Notably, objects of the non-preferred size also have a response well above baseline
in all of these regions (See Supplementary Information; see also Fig. 2, Fig. 4, and
Supplementary Fig. 1). Thus, the big and small regions described here should not be
considered highly-selective modules, as has been argued about other category-selective
regions along occipito-temporal cortex (Kanwisher, 2010). Rather, these data are
consistent with a distributed account of the representation of everyday objects, where
a large swath of cortex is active during the processing of such objects, but to different
degrees (Haxby et al., 2001; Ishai et al., 1999). We demonstrate that the size of the
object in the world predicts more medial or lateral ventral cortex engagement.
Relationship to surrounding characterized regions
Previous studies characterizing category-selective regions along the ventral and lat-
eral surface of visual cortex have found that these regions come in pairs, e.g for
faces (FFA-fusiform face area, OFA-occipital face area), bodies (FBA-fusiform body
area, EBA-extrastritate body area), general shape-selectivity (pFS-posterior fusiform,
LOC-lateral occipital complex), and scenes (PPA-parahippocampal place area, TOS-
transoccipital sulcus; see Schwarzlose et al., 2008). These regions are arranged in a
mirrored fashion from medial-ventral wrapping around the lateral surface to medial-
dorsal regions (Hasson et al., 2003), with the ventral surface showing more overall
visual form information and the lateral surface showing more location-, motion-, and
local shape information (Beauchamp et al., 2002; Drucker & Aguirre, 2009; Haushofer
et al., 2008; Schwarzlose et al., 2008). Consistent with this pattern, we also observed
big and small object regions fitting into this large-scale mirrored organization, with
BigV and SmallA on the ventral surface and SmallP and BigD on the lateral surface
(Fig. 5a). Thus the properties that have been discovered for the highly-selective re-
gions may also apply to the nearby regions of less-selective object-responsive cortex,
where object size predicts the large scale topographic organization of objects that
have a more distributed representation.
The SmallP and BigV ROIs show proximity to and overlap with the well-known
functionally localized regions of the lateral occipital complex (LOC: objects>scrambled;
Grill-Spector et al., 1999) and the parahippocampal place area (PPA: scenes>objects;
Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998, Fig. 5b, see Supplementary Methods). SmallP is just
anterior to LOC, which is nearby and partially overlapped with other related regions
such as the extrastriate body area (EBA), motion area MT, and the medial tempo-
ral gyrus tool area (MGT-TA; Beauchamp et al., 2002; Chao et al., 1999; Downing
et al., 2001; Valyear & Culham, 2010). BigV is partially overlapped with PPA,
a scene-selective region which has also been shown to have a reliable response to
objects, particularly large objects such as buildings (Aguirre et al., 1998; Diana et
al., 2008; Downing et al., 2006; Epstein, 2005; Litman et al., 2009), as well as to
strongly contextual objects (Bar, 2004), which tend to be larger than non-contextual
objects (Mullally & Maguire, 2011). Interestingly, both LOC and PPA have recently
been showed to modulate their responsiveness with the implied size/distance of the
depicted object (Amit et al., 2008; Cate et al., 2011), with object size predicting
parametric activity in parahippocampal cortex (Mullally & Maguire, 2011).
Given the relationship between the PPA and the BigV region, one concern is that
responses in the BigV region may be driven by scene imagery (O'Craven & Kanwisher,
2000), where bigger-sized objects are more likely to cause observers to imagine a scene
than smaller objects. However, such an account would predict that imagining giant
apples would lead to more scene imagery than tiny pianos, and this pattern of data
was not observed in the BigV region. Additionally, given the rapid presentation rates
of the visually-presented objects, we think scene-imagery is unlikely to account for the
full range of data reported here (Epstein & Ward, 2010; see also Mullally & Maguire,
2011)
While it is possible to test whether these overlapping regions along lateral and
ventral cortex are driven more by shape statistics, contextual associations, implied
distance, or objects of different sizes, likely there is no single "high-level" description
that will perfectly capture the response properties of these large regions of cortex.
Under the proposal here, these regions of cortex are more likely to be involved in
the processing and storage of small or large objects, where the exact nature of those
stored representations across the ventral surface remains an open question.
Proposals for the topography of object knowledge
Existing proposals for large-scale organization of object knowledge in ventral cortex
argued for spatial clustering by conceptual superordinate categories (e.g. food, an-
imals, tools; Chao et al., 1999; Mahon & Caramazza, 2011; see also Weber et al.,
2009), by some perceptual shape space (Ishai et al., 1999; Op de Beeck et al., 2008b)
or by eccentricity biases that stem from local or global visual processing needs (Hasson
et al., 2002; Levy et al., 2001; Malach et al., 2002) or high-level cognitive processes
(Gauthier, 2000). Here we make the proposal that a physical parameter (the size of
objects in the world) may capture some of the variance of organization and can refine
and extend these featural and processing-based proposals. Why might the real-world
size of objects be a natural parameterization of object knowledge?
One possibility is that the size of objects in the world gives rise to systematic biases
in retinal visual experience which are extracted in early visual areas and ultimately
dictate where high-level object representations will be in more anterior cortex. This
idea most closely dovetails with the eccentricity-bias hypothesis of Levy, Hasson, and
Malach, which proposes that high-level object representations extend anteriorly from
particular eccentricities bands in early retinotopic cortex (Hasson et al., 2003; Levy
et al., 2001; Levy et al., 2004; Malach et al., 2002). In support of this proposal, Levy
et al., (2001) found face-selective areas tend to have a foveal-bias while scene-selective
areas have a peripheral bias, and these extend from center and peripheral early vi-
sual areas respectively. This organization is consistent with recently discovered full
retinotopic maps, where the fovea to periphery maps from lateral to medial ventral
cortex (Arcaro et al., 2009). To apply the center-periphery organization to other cat-
egories, Malach et al. (2002) proposed that the location of different object categories
might be driven by different processing resolution needs, whether it be analysis of
fine-detail (foveal) or more holistic integration (peripheral), similar to arguments for
process-dependent organization (Gauthier, 2000). However, this proposal does not
easily lead to testable predictions about other objects until it is first determined what
kinds of processing resolution an object requires (Tyler et al., 2005). Further, it has
also recently been shown that scene-selective areas actually show a greater response
to high spatial frequency (Rajimehr et al., 2008), inconsistent with the idea of coarser
spatial processing.
Here we make a more explicit prediction that the experienced retinal size, as well
as other correlated dimensions such as object curvature and spatial frequency content,
are systematically related to the real-world size of the objects (with smaller rounder
objects subtending smaller visual angles at typical distances than larger boxier ob-
jects). Unsupervised efficient learning mechanisms in the early visual hierarchy may
extract these regularities in eccentricity and shape (Attneave, 1954; Carlson et al.,
2011; Field, 1987); by more anterior stages along the visual hierarchy, the more scale-
and position-tolerant visual representation in these areas may be naturally arrayed
along the cortical sheet in a continuous manner, with small-object features extended
from foveal cortex and large-object features extended from more peripheral cortex
(see Hasson et al., 2003).
In addition to biases in incoming visual experience, requirements for subsequent
processing for action and navigation might also predict that real-world size would
be a valuable organizing dimension of object representation. This is similar to the
connectivity-hypothesis proposed by Mahon and Caramazza, in which the organiza-
tion of object representation is driven by long-range network connectivity (Mahon &
Caramazza, 2011; Mahon et al., 2007): manipulable objects like tools may require
different "down-stream" processing requirements than animate objects like animals.
Thus, the ventral stream organization may be driven not by biases in experience, but
instead by functional-connectivity with dorsal regions subserving different action rep-
resentations. The real-world size of objects naturally constrains the kinds of actions
and effectors that will be used when an observer interacts with an object, and thus
extends this proposal beyond animals and tools to the large range of other biological
and manmade artifacts, which often get grouped together as "other objects" (Hasson
et al., 2003; Op de Beeck et al., 2008a). Real-world object size is a natural proxy
for the underlying continuum between manipulable and navigationally-relevant fea-
tures. Finally, while the eccentricity-bias and connectivity-driven hypotheses have
been discussed as competing alternatives, the real-world size of objects unifies these
proposals, suggesting both bottom-up experience-driven learning and top-down re-
quirements for subsequent actions provide convergent pressures for object knowledge
to be topographically organized by real-world size.
Methods
Participants
22 healthy observers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated in one
or more of the experiments in a 2 hr fMRI session (age 19-36, 13 female, 21 right-
handed). Informed consent was obtained according to procedures approved by the
MIT Internal Review Board.
MRI Acquisition
Imaging data were collected on a 3T Siemens fMRI Scanner at the Martinos Center
at the McGovern Institute for Brain Research at MIT. Experiments 1 and 3 used a
12-channel phased-array head coil and Experiment 2 used a 32-channel phased-array
head coil. Blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) contrast was obtained with
a gradient echo-planar T2* sequence (33 oblique axial slices acquired parallel to the
anterior commissure - posterior commissure line; 64 x 64 matrix; FoV = 256 x 256
mm; 3.1 x 3.1 x 3.1 mm voxel resolution; Gap thickness = 0.62 mm; TR = 2000 ms;
TE = 30 ms; Flip angle = 90 degrees).
Experiment 1: Big and Small Object Localizer
12 observers were shown images of big real-world objects and small real-world objects
in a standard blocked design. All objects were shown at the same visual angle (9x9
degrees). Each block was 16s during which 20 images were shown per block for 500
ms each with a 300 ms blank following each item. Fixation periods of 10s intervened
between each stimulus block. Ten blocks per condition were shown in a single run of
8.8 min (265 volumes). A total of 200 big and 200 small distinct object images were
presented. Observers were instructed to pay attention to the objects and to press a
button when a red frame appeared around an item, which happened once per block.
Experiment 2: Retinal Size Manipulation
8 observers were shown blocks of big and small objects at big and small retinal sizes.
The big and small objects stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1, and the retinal
sizes were 11x11 degrees visual angle and 4x4 degrees visual angle for the small and
big visual sizes, respectively. The blocked design and stimuli were the same as in
Experiment 1: each block was 16s during which 20 images were shown for 500 ms each
with a 300 ms blank following each item. Blocks were separated by fixation periods
of 10s. There were four conditions (2 real-world sizes x 2 retinal sizes), presented in a
pseudorandom order, such that all conditions appeared in a shuffled order 5 times per
run (8.8 min, 265 volumes). Two runs were conducted in this experiment, yielding 10
blocks per condition. Observers were instructed to pay attention to the objects and
to press a button when a red frame appeared around an item, which happened once
per block.
Experiment 3: Mental Imagery
The names of different objects were presented aurally to 8 naive observers, and ob-
servers were instructed form a mental image of each object. Observers' eyes were
closed for the entire duration of each run. In 16s blocks, observers heard 5 object
names (3.2 s per object), followed by the word "blank" signifying the beginning of
each 10s blank interval. Runs always began with a 10 second blank interval. The
two main conditions were blocks of small object names (e.g. "peach") and big object
names (e.g. "lawn chair"). In two additional conditions, observers imagined these
small objects at giant sizes (e.g. hearing the words "giant peach") and the big objects
at tiny sizes (e.g. hearing the words "tiny lawn chair"). There were 30 small objects
and 30 big objects, divided into two sets. Each run used the stimuli from one set
and contained 3 blocks of each condition, lasting for 5.4 min (161 volumes). Six runs
were conducted in the experiment, three for each object set, yielding 12 total blocks
per condition. All imagery runs were conducted first, prior to the presentation of any
experiments with visual stimuli, including the Big Small Object localizer.
Sounds were presented through Sensimetric MRI Compatible Insert Earphones.
To set the volume levels in the scanner, a functional run was started and the volume
of the stimuli was slowly increased until the participant pressed a button indicating
they could hear the stimuli clearly.
Before the experiment, observers were given detailed instructions that they should
imagine only isolated objects, and that "giant" versions of small objects should be
imagined "as having the same size as a car or piano" while tiny versions of large objects
should be imagined "as having the same size as a matchbox or something that could
fit in your hand." Observers then were given a short practice run outside the scanner
in which they were presented with one block each of small objects, big objects, tiny
versions of big objects, and giant versions of small objects, with intervening blank
periods. None of these practice object stimuli were used in the main experiment.
Experiment 4: Object Category Blocks
8 observers were shown blocks of objects by category. Each block was 16s, during
which 16 object exemplars from a category were presented for 700 ms with a 300 ms
blank following each item at 9x9 degrees visual angle. Fixation periods of 10s preceded
and followed each stimulus block. The visual stimuli consisted of 16 different object
categories, each with 16 different exemplars per category, which ranged systematically
in real-world size. The 16 object categories were divided into two groups of 8, both of
which contained the whole range of real-world sizes (see Supplemental Materials). In
each run, 8 categories from a set were shown in a random order and repeated in the
second half of the run again in a random order. This ensured that each category was
seen more than once per run and occurred in both the first and second half of the run.
Each run was 7.1 min (213 volumes). Four runs were conducted in the experiment,
two for each image set, yielding four stimulus blocks per category. Observers were
instructed to pay attention to the objects and to press a button when a red frame
appeared around an item, which happened once per block.
Data Analysis
Functional data were preprocessed using Brain Voyager QX software (Brain Innova-
tion, Maastricht, Netherlands). Preprocessing included slice scan-time correction, 3D
motion correction, linear trend removal, temporal high pass filtering (0.01Hz cutoff),
spatial smoothing (4-mm FWHM kernel), and transformation into Talairach coordi-
nates. For the ROI overlap computations, analyses were performed on unsmoothed
functional data in ACPC space (no talairach transform).
Statistical analyses were based on the general linear model. All GLM analyses
included regressors for each experimental condition, defined as square-wave regressors
for each stimulus presentation time convolved with a gamma-function to approximate
the idealized hemodynamic response. A whole-brain, random affects group average
analysis was conducted on data from the Big Small Object localizer (Experiment 1).
A contrast was performed at an uncorrected threshold of P < 0.001 (cluster threshold
of 100mm 3 ) to test for regions more active to small vs. big objects and visa vera.
To obtain regions-of-interest from the Big Small Localizer, whole-brain GLMs
were conducted for each individual. The SmallA and SmallP regions were defined from
contrasts of Small>Big, and the BigV regions were defined from the opposite contrast
of Big>Small. All ROIs were taken from t-maps corrected at FDR<0.05, with a
cluster threshold of 10. In some cases, the threshold was made more conservative,
e.g. when the SmallA and SmallP regions, which each have distinct peaks, were
connected by voxels with lower t-values. If any of the targeted ROIs were not present
at FDR<0.05, the threshold was lowered to FDR<0.02. If no clear ROI was present
at that threshold, then that ROI was not defined for that participant. ROIs were
defined as the set of contiguous voxels that were significantly activated around the
peak voxel identified from within a restricted part of cortex based on the anatomical
position.
For all ROI analyses, all ROIs were defined from the Big Small Localizer (indepen-
dent dataset), and the response of these regions to different experimental conditions
was assessed in subsequent experiments. For each subject and each ROI, GLMs were
run on the average time series of the voxels in the ROI to obtain regression coefficients
(betas) for the experimental conditions. For experiments with 2x2 designs (Experi-
ment 2: Retinal size manipulation; Experiment 3: Mental Imagery), to evaluate the
effects of each factor across observers, repeated-measures ANOVAs were run on the
betas across observers for each ROI. For the parametric ROI analysis (Experiment
3: Category Blocks), the correlation between the real-world size rank order and the
beta weights for those object categories was computed for each subject and each ROI.
These r-values were Fisher's-z transformed (to be distributed normally), and t-tests
were subsequently conducted to test whether these single-subject correlations were
reliably different than zero.
Supporting Information
Supplementary Methods: Effect size in big and small regions
In 8 participants, we presented two runs of the big small object localizer (see Experi-
ment 1 Online Methods). Regions of interest were defined from the first run of the big
small object localizer, and the magnitude of response in each region was estimated
using data from the second run of the same experiment. Each region showed a reli-
able differential response to objects of big and small known sizes, while also showing
an above-baseline response to objects with the non-preferred size. The results are






















Supplementary Figure 1. Effect Size estimation from independent data. Beta weights
are shown for the big- and small-preference regions in the left-hemisphere. Error bars









BIgV .71 (.23) 1.23 (.18) t(6)=3.54, p<0.05 t(6)=3.11, p<0.05
SmallA 1.4 (.18) .89 (.11) t(6)=4.61, p<0.005 t(6)=7.83, p<0.001
SmallP 1.59 (.14) 1.06 (.14) t(7)=16.63, p<0.001 t(7)=7.57, p<0.001
objects in indepen-Supplementary Table 1. Average beta weights for big and small
dently localized big and small regions in the left hemisphere.
Supplementary Methods: Category Blocks Stimuli
In the category blocks experiment, object categories were chosen based on size ranking
results from Konkle & Oliva, 2011. In that study, observers sorted 100 objects into
8 bins according to their known size. The 8 size ranks reflected a logarithmic scaling
of actual size in the world. In the current study, the 16 object categories used in
the category blocks experiment were chosen to have 2 objects from each size rank.
These 16 categories were divided into two image groups, where a single run of the
experiment used images from either group 1 or group 2. Image group 1 contained
keys, donuts, shoes, backpacks, grills decorative screens, tractors, and arches. Image
group 2 contained rings, video game controllers, pizzas, guitars, lawnmowers, tends,
fountains, and semi trucks. A graph of the actual typical size of these 16 object
categories is shown in Supplementary Figure 2.
Supplementary Figure 2. Known object size of stimuli in Experiment 2: Category
Blocks. The typical real-world size of 16 different objects categories was measured
or estimated based on internet searches. Here actual size was characterized as the
linear distance between opposing corners of the 3D bounding box (i.e sqrt(height2 +
width2 + depth2 )). Left: Plot of the actual size of objects with a linear scale. Right:
Plot of the actual size of objects with a log scale. See Konkle & Oliva, 2011.
Supplementary Methods: Single Subject Correlations in Category Blocks
Experiment
The big and small regions showed a parametric modulation of overall activity based
on the real-world size of the object category. This effect was reliable both at the
group level and single subject level.
At the group level, beta values were computed for each category from an ROI
GLM for each subject, the beta values were averaged across subjects, and then the
correlation was computed. Activation increased with increasing known size in the big
region (BigV: r = 0.69, p = 0.003), and decreased in the small regions, as predicted
(SmallA: r = -0.67,p = 0.005; SmallP: r = -0.58,p = 0.017).
At the single subject level, Pearson's r was computed for each subject, and Fischer-
z transformed to follow a normal distribution, and then t-tests of these single subject
correlation coefficients were conducted to test for difference from zero. We observed a
significant modulation of activity in the predicted directions for the big and small re-
gions (BigV: mean R = 0.51, t(7) = 8.1, p < 0.001; SmallA: mean R = -0.46, t(4) =
-4.7,p = 0.009; SmallP: mean R = -0.36, t(7) = -4.0,p = 0.005). This also held
when the Spearman rank-order correlation was computed for each subject. Sup-
plementary Table 2 indicates for each region the number of subjects who showed
modulation of activity in the predicted direction and in the unpredicted direction.
# subs with # subs with #subs with significant
correlation in significant correlation correlation in
predicted direction Predicted direction unpredicted direction
BigV-L 8/8 6/8 0/8
BigV-R 8/8 6/8 0/8
SmalIP-L 7/8 2/8 0/8
SmaliP-R 5/5 3/5 0/5
SmalIA-L 5/5 2/5 0/5
Supplementary Table 2. Summary of parametric modulations across subjects for Ex-
periment 4: category blocks. We predicted increasing activation with increasing size
for the big region, and decreasing activation for the small regions. Nearly all sub-
jects showed modulations in the predicted direction with most showing a significant
correlation at the single subject level. No subjects showed significant modulations in
these regions in the opposite direction.
Supplementary Methods: Characterizing Reliability and Overlap of ROIs
The Small and Big ROIs showed proximity to and overlap with the well-known func-
tionally localized regions of the lateral occipital complex (LOC: objects>scrambled;
Grill-Spector et al., 1999) and the parahippocampal place area (PPA: scenes>objects;
Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998). To characterize the overlap between these areas, we first
gathered data from a new set of 7 observers on two runs of the Big and Small ROI lo-
calizer and two runs of a PPA and LOC localizer described below. We then computed
overlap between two ROIs, e.g. LOC and SmallP, and compared it to the overlap of
the ROI to itself across runs. Overlap was characterized using a procedure modified
from previous methods (Scholz et al., 2009).
PPA and LOC were localized from a standard localizer experiment in which stim-
ulus blocks of scenes, objects, faces, and scrambled objects were shown, with each
block lasting 16s during which 20 images were shown for 500ms each with a 300 ms
blank (images shown at 9x9 degrees visual angle). Fixation periods of 10s preceded
and followed each stimulus block. The conditions were presented in a pseudorandom
order, such that all 4 conditions appeared in a shuffled order 4 times per run. A run
was 7.1 min (213 volumes). Observers were instructed to press a button when a red
frame appeared around an item, which happened once per block.
Overlap between two target regions was computed over a range of t-value thresh-
olds then averaged, allowing for regions to be different sizes. For any two regions
being compared, the range of t-values started at the maximum t-value of the two
region's FDR<0.05 threshold, and increased by steps of 0.02 to the lowest of the two
peak t-values. Additionally, we required a minimum of 10 voxels and a maximum of
500 voxels from both ROIs at any given threshold. The analysis proceeded by get-
ting the contiguous set of voxels around the peak voxel that were above the specific
threshold within an anatomically defined mask. At each threshold, degree of overlap
was quantified as the percent of voxels of the smaller region were contained in the
larger region, for left hemisphere ROIs only. This measure can be conceptualized as
what percent the smaller region is contained in the bigger region without relying on
a specific arbitrary t-threshold.
The overlap analysis showed that the LOC region across two runs was 72%
(SEM=6%) contained with itself, and the SmallP region was 81% contained with
itself (SEM=11%). Given these numbers as reference of within-ROI reliability, the
SmallP was on average 35% contained in the LOC region (SEM 6) (See Supplementary
Table 3). Thus while there is some overlap between LOC and SmallP, the regions
which show a preference for small objects are not capturing the same region as is
localized with objects>scrambled.
The PPA region across two runs was 85% contained (SEM=8%) and the Big
region across two runs was 90% contained (SEM = 3%). Comparing these two regions
together, the PPA and Big regions were on average 58% contained (SEM=11%) (See
Supplementary Table 3). On average there was relatively more overlap between PPA
and Big regions then there was with LOC and SmallP regions.
BigV1 PPA1 BigV1 PPA1 SmP1 LOC1 SmP1 LOCi
BigV2 PPA2 PPA2 BIgV2 SmP2 LOC2 LOC2 SmP2
Sub1 0.91 0.81 0.21 0.01 0.95 0.87 0.52 0.80
Sub2 - 0.98 - - 1.00 0.93 0.00 0.27
Sub3 0.81 0.86 0.38 0.95 0.75 0.57 0.26 0.46
Sub4 - 0.92 0.19 - 0.32 0.59 0.36 0.19
Sub5 0.98 0.93 - 0.91 - 0.69 0.61 -
Sub6 0.89 0.93 0.68 0.97 0.99 0.78 0.14 -
Sub7 0.93 0.36 0.84 0.44 0.86 0.58 0.27 0.35
Mean 0.90 0.83 0.46 0.66 0.81 0.72 0.31 0.41
SEM 0.03 0.08 0.56 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.11
Supplementary Table 3: Average % containment between a region with itself across
runs and with the comparison region across runs. For example, BigV1 indicates
the big-preference region (big>small) defined from the first functional run; BigV2
indicates the big-preference region defined from the second functional run. SmP1





In this thesis, I proposed that the real-world size is an intrinsic part of object represen-
tation, with behavioral consequences for perceptual tasks, and neural consequences for
the spatial topography of object knowledge. Here, I summarize the empirical findings
and suggest that they can be coherently explained by thinking about the experience
of an observer situated in a three-dimensional world. I introduce this situated ob-
server framework, and highlight the implications for models of object representation
and the organization of cortex.
Summary of Empirical Findings
Real-world objects have a canonical visual size
In Chapter 2, we observed that when people draw or imagine objects, requiring them
to access their perceptual object representations, the visual size at which objects
are elicited depends systematically on known size. Additionally, when people resize
pictures of objects to look best (putatively to provide the best "representational fit",
Palmer, Schloss, and Gardner, in press), they scale objects to be proportional to
the log of the known size. Thus, when accessing existing object representations to
perform a variety of tasks, there is a systematic relationship between the visual size of
the objects and their real-world size. Akin to the previous literature showing objects
CAgoNIcAt. mo"OMMWOIA CANOWcAL NW.CANOWAL
Figure 1: Canonical and non-canonical perspective of a tricycle, from Palmer, Rosch,
& Chase, 1981. Canonical and non-canonical visual size of the tricycle, from Konkle
& Oliva, 2011.
have a canonical perspective, this suggests that objects also have a canonical visual
size (Figure 1).
How does canonical visual size influence models of object representation? Objects
can be recognized across a range of visual sizes, and this visual-size invariance has
led to the inference that object representations do not contain visual size information
(e.g. Biederman & Cooper, 1992). However, we suggest that visual size information
is stored for each object, and this visual size information is systematically related to
the known size of objects in the world.
Real-world size processing is automatic
When we are presented with an object, we can automatically and rapidly recognize
it and name its category. In Chapter 3, we found that our knowledge of real-world
size is also accessed automatically during object processing: when you see a familiar
object, you not only know what it is, you also know how big it is in the world.
In our familiar-size Stroop task, two real-world objects of big and small known
sizes (e.g. A piano and an apple) were presented side by side on the screen at two
different visual (or retinal) sizes. Observers' task was to make judgments about
the visual size (e.g. Which is bigger on the screen?). Object identity and real-
world size was irrelevant to the task. Nevertheless, we observed a familiar-size stroop
effect: for example, when the piano was presented bigger than the apple (congruent
trials), observers were faster to make visual size judgments than when the known size
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Congruent Incongruent
Figure 2: Example congruent and incongruent displays for the familiar-size Stroop
task
mismatched with the retinal size (incongruent trials; Figure 2). We showed that this
effect is not cognitively penetrable, but instead likely arises from richer knowledge
about real-world size acquired over time.
One of the defining characteristics of object recognition is that we can recognize the
category of an object over different positions, viewpoints, and visual sizes. However,
even though we can recognize an apple whether it's depicted on a stamp or a billboard,
these data suggest that in doing so we also automatically access its typical size in the
world. The results suggest that our perceptual representations of objects not only
give rise to automatic categorization, they also give rise to automatic real-world size
information. This provides support for the claim that the real-world size of objects
is a basic and fundamental property of object representation.
Real-world size predicts the spatial organization of object rep-
resentation
In Chapter 4, we examined the impact of real-world size on the neural organization of
object knowledge. Specifically, we examined the representations of everyday objects
excluding faces, animals, and classically-defined tools, and asked whether there were
any regions that were differentially selective to objects of big and small known size.
Our findings showed a consistent organization of big and small objects in medial to











Figure 3: Evidence for a mirrored macro organization. Along the ventral surface of
the temporal lobe, there was medial to lateral organization of preference for big to
small objects (BigV to SmallA). This organization was mirrored on the lateral surface
(SmallP to BigD).
along the lateral surface, with small to big organization moving from lateral to medial.
Thus, consistent with ideas of Hasson et al. (2003), we find support for a mirrored
macro organization of object knowledge (Figure 3).
Several follow-up experiments characterized the responses of these big and small
preference regions, showing the underlying representations are tolerant to changes
in visual size, are activated during mental imagery, and are active for a range of
different object categories of the preferred size, and thus not solely driven by objects
like monuments or tools. It is important to note that in general, these objects drive
a large above-baseline responses across ventral cortex. Thus these regions are not
highly-selective modules for big objects only or small objects only, but instead show
a systematic differential response.
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The current state of understanding about the organization of object representa-
tion across cortex is that there are islands of category selectivity amongst a sea of
heterogenous (but systematic) responses whose organization is unknown. The results
of Chapter 4 show evidence that real-world size is a coarse organizing dimension un-
derlying these distributed activation patterns of different object categories. It will be
exciting to more closely examine whether previously established category-selective re-
gions are arranged within this broader size-based organizational scheme, as the areas
for faces and bodies typically fall in between the Small and Big regions of selectivity
(see also Chapter 4, Figure 5).
A Situated-Observer Framework
The empirical results of this thesis argue for a critical role of real-world size for
object representation. This novel approach arises from the observation that objects
are fundamentally physical entities-our experience with objects, both in our lifetime
and over evolutionary time, arises as situated observers in a three-dimensional world.
Here I outline the critical points of this situated-observer framework and discuss the
implications of the empirical findings from within this unifying context.
The three-dimensional world structures the shape, size, and various features of
objects (Haldane, 1928; see Appendix): natural objects in the world have optimized
their shape and sizes to be coordinated with their biological infrastructure and func-
tions. This implies that there are systematic characteristics of objects based on their
physical size. Additionally, the three-dimensional world structures how we experience
these objects: we observe and interact with the world as observers standing from a
height above the horizon, with arms of a certain length, and bodies of a certain size.
The distributions of object information projected on our retina are naturally struc-
tured based on these geometric constraints, giving rise to biases in experienced retinal
size, eccentricity, elevation, spatial frequency, and orientation based on object size.
Furthermore, we adopt the prominent theory that the visual system is tuned
to the statistics of the natural world (Gilbert et al. 2001, Simoncelli & Olshausen
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2001, see also Kourtzi & Conner, 2011). Cortical circuits extract the covariance of
features in their input in order to form efficient representations of incoming visual
information (Attneave, 1954; Carlson et al., 2011; Field, 1987). Supporting evidence
for this comes from the tuning of V1, whose Gabor-like features can be derived from
a computationally optimal representation of natural scene statistics (Olshausen &
Field, 1996).
Combined, these assertions can provide a coherent framework explaining why we
have a canonical visual size for different sized objects, and how the cortex comes to be
organized by real-world size, and why some categories of objects may have clustered
regions while others have more distributed regions. It is important to point out that
experience was not manipulated in any of the current studies; rather we examined the
representations of objects an adult human observers, which have been acquired and
established over a lifetime of visual experience, with visual tuning priors established
over evolutionary time. However, this experience-based framework allows us to make
testable predictions about why object representation is organized this way and may
subsequently provide new insights for models of object representation.
Why do objects have a canonical visual size?
Within the situated observer framework, canonical visual size is most naturally ex-
plained by the most experienced retinal size. If the visual system naturally learns and
stores the regularities between the real-world size of objects and experienced retinal
size, then a strong prediction is that the canonical visual size reflects the mode of ex-
perienced retinal size. While geometric inferences can be made that small retinotopic
envelope sizes are typical for small objects in typical viewing conditions and large
retinotopic envelope sizes are typical for very large objects, characterizing the actual
distributions has not yet been done.
What drives the real-world size topography of occipito-temporal cortex?
A prominent proposal for what drives the organization of occipito-temporal cortex is
the eccentricity-bias hypothesis (Hasson et al., 2003; Levy et al., 2001; Malach et al.,
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2002). On this account, eccentricity mapping is observed even in higher level regions,
with some regions showing peripheral biases and other regions showing foveal biases.
They propose that some object categories require global processing and will be rep-
resented in peripherally-biased regions, whereas other object categories require local
processing and will be represented in foveally-biased regions. Thus the organization
of object representation is driven by eccentricity biases of different object categories.
However, one of the major criticisms of this account is that it is not clear what kind
of processing is required for different objects (e.g. if faces are processed holistically,
that might predict a more peripheral, global processing location; See Tyler et al.,
2005).
In the situated-observer framework, however, the real-world size of objects is cor-
related with experienced eccentricity: small objects are more likely to appear within
the fovea, whereas large objects tend to extend into the periphery and to appear
peripherally. Based on these retinal size statistics, small objects will drive more
foveal visual cortex while big objects will drive more peripheral visual cortex. Thus,
real-world size topography is a natural consequence of size-induced retinal biases in
visual experience. One strength of the account proposed here is that it makes spe-
cific predictions about the distribution of activity for any object category, based on
systematic biases in retinal size, and not processing-demands per se. For example,
future work can test whether the spatial distribution of activation for any arbitrary
object category can be predicted from the natural distribution of experienced retinal
sizes for that category, or whether experimentally manipulating the distribution of
experienced retinal sizes (e.g., for novel objects) would affect the spatial distribution
of activation.
Additionally, real-world size is correlated with other low-level features, e.g. spatial
frequency, orientation and elevation (see Appendix). This suggests that the kind
of early shape features extracted in foveal cortex will be more suited for efficiently
representing small objects, and similarly for big objects in more peripheral cortex.
As a consequence of the large-scale eccentricity organization, these pre-cursor object
representations may naturally be arrayed along the cortical sheet by real-world size.
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Why do only some object categories have focal regions?
One potential answer to this question is that some objects may have a tighter range of
experienced visual sizes than others. Additionally, in a specific band of eccentricity,
visual input may be dominated by one (or a few) kinds of objects (Figure 4). Indeed,
the frequency of experience, and in particular early experience, has been argued to
affect the degree of spatial clustering of category-specific features, for example in the
visual-word form area (McCandliss, Cohen, & Dehaene, 2003), and a similar symbol-
selective area in monkeys (Srihasam & Livingstone, 2011). On such an account,
faces, bodies, and word strings are some of the most frequent categories in our visual
experience; an efficient representational system might devote more representational
space to these categories.
abc
Experienced Retinal Size
Figure 4: Hypothetical distributions of for the frequency of different experienced
retinal sizes, for letters, thumbtacks, faces, chairs, and trees.
Interestingly, the proposed framework here also provides a hypothesis about where
these patches of more selective cortex should be located. For example, faces have a
particular range of experienced visual angle (larger than the smallest objects like
coins and berries, smaller than large objects like chairs, and tables), at which they
are likely the dominantly experienced object category. This may predict why the
face-selective regions of cortex are extended from more medium eccentricities (rather
than requiring a deformation step proposed in Hasson, 2003; see also Tyler et al.,
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2005). A similar argument can be made for letter strings. Further data is needed to
examine these specific predictions.
Real-world size as a proxy for the underlying representations
What do these results tell us about the underlying representations in these regions?
This organization raises a fundamental question that has not been addressed in pre-
vious research on object representation: what size-specific visual properties are used
to represent objects? Future research can address this question by investigating what
is being represented in the big and small regions. For example, a focus on this dimen-
sion makes sense of a number of low-level biases that have been observed in high-level
areas (see Appendix), and future work examining how shape changes as a function
of real-world size may be a valuable new approach to thinking about shape param-
eterization. In other words, the work presented in this thesis suggests that the real
world size of objects is a proxy for certain features underlying object representations,
and there future research focusing on these size-specific properties can provide new
insight into the nature of these underlying object representations.
Conclusion
The contributions of this thesis are to establish that real-world size is a core parameter
of object representation, as evidenced by its role in automatic object recognition
processes and the large-scale spatial topography of object knowledge in the visual
cortex. I have proposed a situated observer framework within which to understand
the role of real-world size in object representation and the organization of object
knowledge in the cortex. The visual experience of an active observer in the three-
dimensional world is systematically biased according to the real-world size of objects.
An efficient representational system must take advantage of such systematic biases for
optimal encoding. This work provides testable predictions about retinal size biases in
visual experience, the role of real-world size in object representation, and an approach




Consequences of vision in a
three-dimensional world
Characterizing the statistics of visual experience is a challenging endeavor, usually
requiring head-mounted cameras and advanced image processing techniques. How-
ever, some biases in the retinal experience for different sized objects can be reasonably
inferred from the geometric constraints of an observer situated in a three-dimensional
world.
Here I discuss several dimensions of visual experience which likely have systematic
differences for big and small objects. These dimensions include (i) retinal size and
eccentricity, (iii) spatial frequency and orientation, and (iv) upper/lower visual field
position.
Next, I review neuroimaging results that show low-level visual biases in relatively
high-level object areas beyond extrastriate cortex. In general these different low-level
visual features tend to co-occur and drive object-responsive regions. I discuss these
in the context of eccentricity-bias proposals of object representation, which fail to
correctly predict the convergence of these low-level biases.
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Retinal Size and Eccentricity
For this thesis, the most critical dimension of natural visual experience that needs
to be characterized is the relationship between the physical size of objects in the
world, viewing distance, and the subsequent distribution of experienced retinal sizes
(e.g. See Chapter 1, Figure 2). While this has not been characterized broadly across
object categories, we can make a reasonable inference about typical visual sizes of
experience for the two extremes of real-world size-tiny and giant objects.
In these edge cases, it is likely that very small objects are typically experienced
at smaller visual angles than larger objects. A paperclip subtends 3 degrees at arm's
length-at distances beyond that it is typically occluded and not the focus of attention,
and paperclips are rarely experienced closer than that. For a paperclip to subtend
30 degrees, for example, it would have to be held a couple inches from the eye. Big
objects like cars and houses, typically subtend 30+ degrees visual angle. At farther
distances they too are often occluded by intervening objects (to see a car at 3 degrees
it has to have a vast unblocked expanse in front of it). At closer distances you enter
the part-hierarchy of the object, where now what you are actually seeing is a car
door or handle, and the overall car becomes the context rather than the object of
attention.
It is an open question if this relationship between known size and visual size
holds systematically for entire range of real-world size. A strong prediction from
canonical visual size is that on average across objects, there is a general logarithmic
relationship between the physical size of the objects in the world and their most typical
viewing distance and thus their most experienced retinal size (Figure 1). Based on
the reasoning above, this function would arise because of two different limitations:
at far distances objects of any size become occluded, this happens at closer distances
for a paperclip than it does for a car; at close distances the entire object itself ceases
to be the focus of attention and instead parts of the object are the focus.
We can recognize objects at a large range of visual sizes, assuming they are
centrally-fixated. However, because acuity falls off with eccentricity, in order to rec-
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Figure 1: Top: hypothetical distributions of viewing distance for small and large
objects. Bottom: examples for three how visual size might scale with log real-world
size.
ognize something in the periphery, it has to subtend a larger visual size that increases
proportional to the eccentricity (e.g. Rovamo & Virsu, 1978). In natural experience,
when we are fixating an object, there will be other object information in the periph-
ery. Assuming the retinal size biases described above, it follows that bigger objects
in the world are more likely to be recognized in the periphery than smaller objects
because they tend to subtend larger visual sizes. Thus retinal size biases can also
produce eccentricity biases in object recognition experience for objects of different
real-world sizes.
Shape Biases, Spatial Frequency, and Orientation
Other correlated visual features regarding the shape of objects are evident when
considering that objects have to withstand gravity in the world. In Haldane's 1928
essay "On being the right size", he elegantly explains that there are structural reasons
why living things look the way they do: you cannot simply scale up a mouse to be
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cycles per image (fx)
Figure 2: Analysis of small and big object image statistics. Top: Average image
from 200 images of big objects (left) and 200 images of small images (right). Bottom:
Average Fourier spectrum across these image sets. Sections represent 60, 80, and90%
of the image energy. The Fourier representation is a polar plot: Spatial frequency is
reflected in the radial dimension with low spatial frequencies near the origin and high
spatial frequencies moving outward from the center; Orientation is mapped by polar
angle, with vertical at 0 degrees and horizontal at 90 degrees.
the size of an elephant because the bones would break, the lungs would not deliver
enough oxygen, and the arteries would not withstand the increased pressure needed
to pump blood. In general, if an object is scaled up in physical size keeping the same
material and construction, the mass of the object increases by the cube of the scaling
factor while the surface area only increases by the square of the scaling factor (the
square-cube law). Natural objects tend to have maximized this tradeoff, achieving a
shape that's not overly strong (or weak) for their size (Gordon, 1981). This implies
that there is systematic covariation between shape and real-world size.
What are the shape features that covary with real-world size? A very coarse
answer to this question comes from a inspecting the average Fourier spectra of big
and small objects (Figure 2). In general, big objects have more power at high spatial
frequencies than small objects. Further, big objects have relatively more power at
meridian orientations than oblique orientations, while small objects have relatively
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equal power at meridian and oblique orientations. Put simply, big objects are boxier
and small objects are rounder.
Upper-Lower visual field biases
A well known challenge of vision is to inferring the size (and shape) of an object from
an impoverished 2-dimensional projection: a small object at a close distance can
subtend the same visual angle as a large object of the same shape, at a far distance.
However, it is quite challenging to construct a real-world demo of this problem of
infinite solutions, in which there was an atypically-sized object (e.g. an extra-large
chair) hidden amongst a scene of regular objects, where the entire scene that looked
normal in the two-dimensional projection. Figure 3 shows a simple scene with a
normal sized desk and chair, as well as a chair that is twice the size and farther away
from the camera in order to subtend the same visual angle. Notice that the two
projected views of the scene are not the same. In fact, the large-far away chair is
higher in the picture. It looks either like it is, in fact, large and far away, or like it is
typically-sized but floating.
Aerial View Typically-Sized Chair Large Chair, Far Away
Figure 3: Left: Aerial view with a normal chair and a large chair placed father away
from the camera so as to subtend the same visual angle. Middle & Right: Views of
the typical and large chair.
What is going on here? The answer is that when we view the world, we view it
from an average height of 5.5 ft (1.67 m). It is in fact possible to make the typically-
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sized chair and desk scene project the same view as the large chair far from the desk.
To do so, you need to adopt a "crocodile" view, in which the center of your eye is at
exactly ground level The same scene with a crocodile view is shown in Figure 4.
3D world with "Croc-Eye" camera Matched 2D projections
Figure 4: Croc-eye view. In order for the two chairs and desk to cast the same retinal
projection, the camera needs to be placed at ground level. The matched 2D projection
from this view is shown on the right.
A direct consequence of viewing the world from a height above the croc-eye view is
that the farther objects are away from us, the higher in the visual field they appear.
Recall that bigger objects tend to be experienced at larger distances than smaller
objects. It follows that big objects tend to be experienced higher in the visual field
than small objects.
Correlated low-level features drive high-level regions
Interestingly, these correlated low-level visual biases described above are evidenced
in the response properties of high-level object-responsive areas.
The visual biases for small objects have been reported to drive lateral regions
of visual cortex. For example, in area LOC, which overlaps slightly with the small
posterior region, there is a lower-visual field bias (Carlson, et al., 2010; McKyton &
Zohary, 2007; Sayres & Grill-Spector, 2008; Niemeier, et al., 2005). Lower field biases
are also present in the extrastriate body area and fusiform face area (Schwarzlose et
al, 2008). LOC and surrounding cortex also has a foveal bias (Sayres & Grill-Spector,
2008; Arcaro et al, 2009; Levy et al., 2001; Hasson et al., 2003). LOC also shows a
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preference for concave rather than convex shapes (Haushofer et al, 2008), which is
consistent with the simple rounder/boxier shape statistics suggested here.
The systematic visual biases of big objects tend to drive responses in medial ven-
tral and medial occipito-parietal areas. For example, both the PPA and TOS show an
upper-visual field preference (Schwarzlose et al, 2008). PPA and BigV have a periph-
eral eccentricity bias (Arcaro et al, 2009; Levy et al., 2001; Hasson et al., 2003), and
a larger retinal size bias (Chapter 4). While there is less work specifically examining
shape representation in PPA, it has been recently been shown that PPA responds
more to cubes than spheres, and more to high spatial frequency than low spatial
frequency (Rajimehr, 2011).
Overall these data suggest that in object-selective cortex, along the ventral and
lateral surface, there are a number of consistent low-level biases that co-occur and can
be explained by systematic differences in visual experience for big and small objects.
Interestingly, in most of the paper reporting these biases, their co-occurrence is not
highlighted or explained, though most appeal to natural statistics of experience to
account for them. In none of them is the real-world size of objects, eye-height, or
viewing distance mentioned.
The main framework in which these visual biases are interpreted is the eccentricity-
bias proposal of Malach, Levy, and Hasson (Hasson et al., 2002; Levy et al., 2001;
Malach et al., 2002). In this framework, they suggest that some object categories
may require more local processing (faces) and other categories may require more
global/holistic processing (houses). They propose that the location of these category
selective areas can be explained by extensions of early foveal and peripheral cortex.
However, this account does not predict upper/lower visual field biases, and it reverses
the spatial frequency predictions. This failure of the eccentricity organization to
account for the particular co-occurrences of low-level visual biases has been pointed
to as a weakness of this account (Schwarzlose, 2008; see also Tyler et al., 2005). Here
we suggest that the geometric constraints of an observer in the world unifies these
low-level biases and is consistent with the responses in occipito-temporal cortex. High-
level areas show responses to low-level features because these are generally correlated
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during natural visual experience, and there is no gain in efficiency of representation
to de-correlate the high-level from the low-level responses.
Summary
There are a number of low-level visual statistics that are highly correlated with objects
of different sizes in natural experience. These include, but are not likely limited to,
retinal size and eccentricity, spatial frequency and orientation, shape curvature, and
upper/lower visual field position. These low-level features drive responses in more
anterior visual cortex including the category-selective areas. While this makes it
difficult to put a simple label that fully characterizes the response properties of a
high-level region, it does resonate with the prominent assumption that the visual
system is tuned to the statistics of natural experience. Moving forward it will be
valuable to empirically characterize the distribution of experience along various visual
dimensions, as this can provide leverage to understand covarying structure extracted
by different stages of the visual system.
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